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There is no dispute that courts operate under different constraints and 
obligations when engaging statutory versus common law questions.  The core 
principle of statutory interpretation is “legislative supremacy.”  It directs 
judges to enforce plain legislative commands.  Common law rules, on the other 
hand, are quite literally judge-made.  So common law questions give judges 
broad license to expand or contract “the law” in countless ways.1 
Common law, made case-by-case and accessible only through the study of 
and prediction of outcomes from precedent, is mysterious to the uninitiated.  
Karl Llewellyn’s classic introduction to the common law method dubbed it 
“The Bramble Bush.”2  In many ways, classical contract law reflects the 
common law at its most mysterious.  The reason is that contract law is about 
facilitation rather than prohibition.3  Much of the law involves prohibiting 
particular conduct and properly attempts to describe prohibited conduct 
relatively clearly.4  In contrast, the basic message of contract law is: go out and 
trade, essentially however you want, and here are some default rules for those 
things you do not handle yourselves.  Because trading is so incredibly diverse, 
the default rules must be extremely broad.5  Consequently, judges have crafted 
a multitude of variations and exceptions to “black letter” contract law in order 
to accommodate particular circumstances and do justice in particular cases.6  It 
is then quite normal in contract law for courts to adjust or sometimes entirely 
reject some general default rule, because in context, the opposite result is 
                                                 
 1. Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 886–87 (2006). 
 2. Steve Shepard, Introduction to KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE 
CLASSIC LECTURES ON THE LAW AND LAW SCHOOL x, xi (Oxford University Press 2008) (1930). 
 3. See Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 
858–59 (1999) (noting that the allowance of free choice and individual pursuit of self-interests 
inhibited by prohibitions maximize wealth and the efficiency of market resources). 
 4. Edward Rubin summarizes that, “[a]ccording to [Jeremy] Bentham, everything that is 
called a law in ordinary speech is actually two laws: a principal law, which imposes an obligation 
on a defined group of people, and a punitive law, which requires a governmental agent to punish 
any member of that group who fails to fulfill the obligation.”  Edward L. Rubin, Law and 
Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 374 (1989). 
 5. See Leslie M. Bock, Sales in the Information Age: Reconsidering the Scope of Article 2, 
27 IDAHO L. REV. 463, 473 (1991) (stating that the code system sought to “encompass as much of 
the commercial world as possible”). 
 6. LLEWELLYN, supra note 2, at 47–48.  Llewellyn characterizes the harmonizing of 
similar cases that have different results as the “case system game.”  Id. at 47.  Although the rules 
posited by the courts may seem to be inconsistent, a determination of the differences in fact and 
procedural set-up may provide the means to reconcile the inconsistency and give logic to what is 
the reasonable adjustment to a basic rule.  Id. 
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“better.”7  This is as it should be; after all, courts are the source of these 
common law rules.   
There is, of course, another part to this story.  Contracts for the sale of goods 
implicate Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and the UCC is 
decidedly statutory.8  It was conceived as a coherent system and adopted as 
public law by state legislatures.9  It is clearly contract law, which makes us 
think “common law.”  And yet it is quite explicitly statutory.  These dual 
impulses generate conflicting signals about the license and duty that governs 
interpretation of Article 2. 
There are countless places where courts must weave alternately between the 
Code text and the common law10 and many cases where the text of the Code is 
a puzzle whose solution invites common law style analysis.  So an impulse 
toward a free, open, common law style of interpreting Article 2 is easy to 
understand.11  But many times, in circumstances governed by clear and explicit 
statutory commands, cases are decided contrary to statute, however, often with 
acknowledgement by the court that the text requires the opposite outcome.12  
Indeed, on some of the most basic instructions about contract formation and 
                                                 
 7. One such default rule of contracts is that courts will not evaluate the adequacy of 
consideration.  See Eyre v. Potter, 56 U.S. 42, 59–60 (1854); see also Phil Bramsen Distrib., Inc. 
v. Mastroni, 726 P.2d 610, 615 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).  The presumption is that the traders’ 
valuations of the consideration should control.  Eyre, 56 U.S. at 60.  However, in cases of alleged 
bad behavior, undue influence, or unconscionability, the inadequacy of the consideration, 
objectively viewed, can be determinative.  See, e.g., Davis v. Kolb, 563 S.W.2d 438, 438–39 
(Ark. 1978); Ryan v. Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377, 1378, 1387 (Del. Ch. 1992); Ahern v. Knecht, 563 
N.E.2d 787, 788, 792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); see also UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE 1974  
§ 5.108(4)(c); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208, cmt. c (1981). 
 8. See Fred H. Miller, Writing Your Own Rules: Contracting Out of (and into) the Uniform 
Commercial Code; Intrastate Choice of Law, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 217, 219 (2006) (describing 
prior acts leading up to the UCC). 
 9. Id.  The UCC was borrowed from the Commission on Uniform State Laws and permits 
traders to opt out of the UCC by agreement.  U.C.C. § 1-302 (2011).  For purposes of this Article, 
citations will refer to the Revised Article 1 of the UCC and the current, pre-revised Article 2 
unless noted otherwise. 
 10. In various places the Code employs and does not separately define traditional common 
law terms. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403 (2011) (governing title and right to transfer goods).  
Operation of this section depends on the difference between “void” and “voidable” title and 
courts must go to the common law to make that determination.  Note, U.C.C. Section 2-403: A 
Reform in Need of Reform, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 539 (1974). 
 11. See John L. Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code, 29 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 341, 346–53 (1988) (citing examples of common law methods in statutory 
interpretation and noting that these common law habits resist change).  Gedid further notes that 
judges may be “particularly uncomfortable with problems involving statutory interpretation 
because of their heavy orientation toward case analysis.  Before enactment of the Code, several 
commentators recognized these prejudices and attachments to the common law methodology as 
serious hurdles that could obstruct successful application of the Code.”  Id. at 346. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
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administration under the Code, there is a sizable, even dominant, body of case 
law and commentary asserting that while the statute says “up,” the actual 
outcome should and will be “down.”  The question is whether this is justifiable 
under some accepted principle of statutory interpretation,13 or whether it is a 
usurpation of the legislative prerogative and therefore illegitimate.14   
Statutory interpretation is complicated.  No statute is perfect.  Nearly every 
legislative effort eventually requires the exercise of judicial discretion to adjust 
for circumstances not precisely anticipated.  Moreover, the Code’s general 
provisions explicitly invite judges to construe the text liberally to provide the 
flexibility necessary for administering rules of facilitation in a constantly 
changing marketplace.15  So the Code, more so than many statutes, anticipates 
and invites judicial creativity.  But the question is whether this or any such 
invitation can justify interpretations that ignore the statutory text entirely and 
repudiate the political and constitutional principles that coalesce in separation 
of powers and legislative supremacy.  These institutional principles define the 
core license and duty that constrains every judge who interprets any statute.16  
They transcend concerns about particular results under particular statutes.  The 
challenge, and it is particularly acute under Article 2, is to reconcile these 
institutional principles with the impulses that press for broad interpretative 
license under the Code.   
The UCC is much more than Article 2 of course.  But because of its 
fundamental grounding in common law of contracts, Article 2 especially 
                                                 
 13. See Sarah Howard Jenkins, Preemption & Supplementation Under Revised 1-103: The 
Role of Common Law & Equity in the New U.C.C., 54 SMU L. REV. 495, 498 (2001) (speculating 
on whether the U.C.C. is “a hybrid, an attempt to formulate a preemptive regimen of rules and 
norms for commercial transactions, accommodating our common law tradition and injecting the 
conscience of the Chancellor into commercial transactions through Section 1-103”). 
 14. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (recognizing legislative 
authority to formulate our nation’s laws and the responsibility of the courts to enforce them). 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. Because I make only the modest claim that various explicitly counter-textual 
interpretations of the Code are illegitimate, I do not engage the abundant theoretical approaches to 
statutory interpretation that tackle its countless harder questions.  Methods and theories of 
interpretation include “textualism,” “intentionalism,” “purposivism,” “legal process,” 
“pragmatism,” and “integrity.”  KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 5 (1999).  The one principle that all theories of interpretation agree on is that 
legislative supremacy is the starting point.  Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and 
Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 281 (1989) (“It is a commonplace that, apart from 
constitutional issues, judges are subordinate to legislatures in the making of public policy.”); see 
also infra Part III (discussing the judicial approach to Article 2).  Hart and Sacks warn that, in 
regard to generally applicable theories, none are truly accepted and consistently applied within 
courts.  HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frikey eds., 
1994). 
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tempts courts to stretch the license granted by the Code.17  It is as if courts are 
operating under a sort of common law inertia, a habit of mind that presumes 
the freedom to adjust, renovate, or flatly repudiate plain statutory commands if 
necessary to generate “better” results.18  Resisting this inertia imposes tedious 
cognitive demands, requiring judges to turn the statutory filter on and off as 
Article 2 questions oscillate between textual commands and common law  
gap-filling.19  And while this might explain some counter-textual 
interpretations of Article 2, explanation is different from justification.  Some 
cases are so blatantly at odds with the statutory text that one cannot escape the 
conclusion that courts have usurped the policy-making function of the 
legislature.  These decisions fail to appreciate that the goals of the Code are not 
the only thing at stake; that the Code, like every statute, is a subpart of the 
broader constitutional and political arrangement between the branches of 
government reflecting their respective obligations to the people, and; that those 
arrangements generate institutional principles, and constitutional mandates that 
dictate far greater fidelity to the text than many courts have paid.20  This 
Article contends that interpretation of Article 2 must take greater account of, 
and ultimately must be reconciled with, the institutional principles that 
undergird all legislation. 
Part I of this Article will plot the landscape, summarizing a spectrum of 
scenarios where case law flouts the text of Article 2.  Part II presents and 
evaluates the arguments for broad interpretative license on the one hand and 
fidelity to the text on the other.  Part III distills from the discussion in Part II, a 
minimum duty of textual fidelity demanded by the Code’s statutory character21 
and evaluates the examples summarized in Part I against that duty.  
I.  SANDPAPER OR CHAINSAWS?  JUDICIAL RENOVATIONS OF ARTICLE 2 
In a variety of contexts, case law interpreting Article 2 has repudiated 
straightforward legislative commands.22  This section will summarize 
                                                 
 17. See infra Part II.A (referring to this license in the discussion of Article 1). 
 18. See Gedid, supra note 11, at 346–53; see also Jenkins, supra note 13, at 506 (“Early 
judicial hostility to derogating the common law, such as the courts’ continued reliance on 
common law devices or analysis that implemented common law policy or values . . . led to  
non-uniform construction of [Article 1].”). 
 19. GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 16 (“[J]udges, like others, do not find it easy to change 
their behavior . . . . The desirable inertia of practices of legal interpretation influences how one 
should conceive any proposals for radical change.”). 
 20. Because judges ultimately are self-policing on this point, when we get to the end of the 
line, it is only dissenters or critical outsiders who press the point of overbroad interpretative 
license.  And so it is here. 
 21. Essentially this will require fidelity to statutory commands that present no textual or 
circumstantial ambiguity.  See infra Part III. 
 22. All of these “adjustments” might be proper responses to the circumstances in the purely 
common law context, but judges charged with administering statutes have a different obligation. 
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examples of that enterprise in sequence.23  Some of these textual departures are 
dramatic.  Others are more subtle.  Although not addressed in Part I of this 
Article, those differences are central to the discussion of interpretative license 
and duty presented in Part III.       
The Statute of Frauds - The common law statute of frauds,24 which requires 
certain contracts to be evidenced by writing, is often deemed to include a 
promissory estoppel exception.  This approach is reflected generally in the 
Restatement of Contracts (Second) section 139.25  So even oral promises 
nominally within the statute are sometimes enforceable when relied upon.  The 
Statute of Frauds rule under section 2-201 of the Code contains no such 
promissory estoppel exception and no explicit reference to one.  Only a 
minority of courts enforce the plain text and refuse to graft a reliance exception 
onto section 2-201.26 
Parol Evidence - Section 2-202 codifies the Parol Evidence Rule for sale of 
goods, declaring that the meaning of a fully integrated written agreement 
cannot be contradicted by prior or contemporaneous oral or written statements.  
It incorporates by reference general administrative provision 1-205 (defining 
                                                 
 23. This is not an exhaustive list. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403 (2003) (requiring reference to 
common law definitions of void and voidable title).  But it does illustrate the spectrum of cases 
from plain counter-textual interpretations to those that demand creative solutions to textual or 
circumstantial ambiguity. 
 24. The common law Statute of Frauds truly is statutory in nature.  CHARLES L. KNAPP ET 
AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 303 (6th ed. 2007).  Courts have taken broad liberties, 
however, in elaborating its details and exceptions through a liberally applied common law 
methodology.  Id. at 304.  In this sense, the “common law” Statute of Frauds poses similar 
questions of textual fidelity and interpretive license and duty that occur under the Code, with the 
Restatement filling the role that the Comments play under the Code—i.e., a powerful remote 
influence on interpretation entirely external to the legislative process.  Id.  Professor Knapp’s 
summary is illustrative: 
Despite their statutory character, the original sections of the English statute have been 
so commonly reproduced and so frequently given judicial construction that they have 
acquired a distinct common law flavor.  It is therefore possible to generalize in 
common law fashion about the construction of the statute of frauds – indeed, not 
merely possible, but necessary.  The statute of frauds as a living rule of law cannot now 
be understood from statutory language alone; the body of court decisions applying the 
statute form an essential part of its substance.  (This is why the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, which ordinarily confines itself to restating the rules of common law 
devotes a whole chapter (§§ 110-150) to explicating the application of the various 
traditional provisions of the statute of frauds. . . .). 
Id. 
 25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981). 
 26. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 24, at 343 (“The majority view is that promissory estoppel 
can operate as an exception to § 2-201 by virtue of § 1-103); see also Vitauts M. Gulbis, 
Annotation, Promissory Estoppel as Basis for Avoidance of UCC Statute of Frauds (UCC §  
2-201), 29 A.L.R. 4th 1006, 1019 (1984 & Supp. 1984) (listing decisions applying the minority 
rule). 
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and summarizing the operation of “course of dealing and usage of trade”) to 
affirm that where express terms cannot be reconciled with course of dealing or 
usage of trade, “express terms control.”  Although there is nothing ambiguous 
about this provision, courts are split on the point, with substantial case law 
holding that course of dealing and trade usage are admissible, even to negate 
the express terms.27  Prominent commentators also counsel defiance of the text.  
Professors James J. White and Roger S. Summers write that trade usage and 
course dealing evidence may, in appropriate circumstances, even override 
express terms.28  
Firm Offers - At common law, an offer may be revoked any time before 
acceptance.  Even an explicit promise to keep the offer open is unenforceable, 
unless supported by consideration.  The Article 2 counterpart to this rule, 
section 2-205 makes “firm offers” irrevocable for a reasonable period, not to 
exceed thirty days, even absent consideration.29   
                                                 
 27. Compare Trent Partners & Assocs., Inc., v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F. Supp. 2d 84, 99 
(D. Mass. 1999) (stating that express terms control inconsistent trade usage), and S. Concrete 
Servs., Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581, 584–85 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (refusing to 
admit evidence of trade usage showing that a quantity term was not binding on either party and 
proposing an approach where unilateral rights to depart from quantity and price should be 
expressly agreed to in the contract), aff’d per curiam, 569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1978), with Tigg 
Corp. v. Dow Corning Corp., 822 F.2d 358, 363 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that a contract between 
parties is not interpreted by its express words alone, but includes trade usage and course of 
dealing whenever reasonable), and Chase Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040, 
1046 (5th Cir. 1971) (admitting usage of trade to contradict express duration term), and Hayter 
Trucking, Inc., v. Shell W. E&P, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 238–40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) 
(allowing trade usage to contradict express termination provision).  Scholars have also noted this 
divergence.  See Roger W. Kirst, Usage of Trade and Course of Dealing: Subversion of the UCC 
Theory, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 811, 863–68 (noting that even standard merger clauses, which reduce 
the possibility that trade usage will be admitted as evidence to contradict express terms, will not 
wholly prevent their introduction because trade usage is not excluded by section 2-202).  See 
generally Amy H. Kastely, Stock Equipment for the Bargain in Fact: Trade Usage, “Express 
Terms,” and Consistency Under Section 1-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 N.C. L. 
REV. 777 (1986) (reviewing trade usage in practice and proposing that trade usage take precedent 
in the case of conflicting terms unless the parties expressly agreed to follow the contractual 
terms). 
 28. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 101 
(Hornbook Series 2d ed. 1980) (“[T]he provision that express terms control inconsistent course of 
dealing [and usages and performance evidence] really cannot be taken at face value.”).  Their 
latest articulation is a bit more reserved: “the provision that express terms control inconsistent 
course of dealing and its cohorts really cannot be taken at face value, at least in some courts.”  
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 119 (Practitioner 
Treatise Series 5th ed. 2006) [hereinafter PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES]. 
 29. U.C.C. § 2-205 (2011) (“An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed record 
that by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of 
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event 
may the period of irrevocability exceed three months.”) 
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The requirements of the firm offer are uncomplicated.  A principle 
requirement is the firm offer must be written.  Despite straightforward 
language, in a broad category of cases, the instructions of 2-205 have been 
“almost completely ignored.”30  In cases involving “Drennan-style”31 
promissory estoppel claims, courts have held offers governed by the Code to 
be irrevocable based on reliance even where they are oral or otherwise fail to 
meet the requirements of section 2-205.32    
Offer and Acceptance Under 2-207 - There are two notable circumstances 
where courts have embellished section 2-207.  The first set of cases has 
developed to avoid what has been called the first shot problem.  The second set 
has addressed the application of section 2-207 to the “shrink wrap” 
transactions.33  These two situations land at very different places on the 
spectrum of legitimacy.   
In its basic operation, section 2-207 repudiates the common law “mirror 
image rule” and its constituent part, the “last shot rule.”34  At common law, one 
implication of the mirror image rule is that where parties exchange forms 
containing different terms (the “battle of the forms”) the last form transmitted 
controls the transaction.  The presumption is that parties exchanged the forms 
during negotiation and the trade was finally settled on the terms of the last 
transmitted document.  Physically consummating the trade is deemed the final  
 
                                                 
 30. Michael T. Gibson, Promissory Estoppel, Article 2 of the UCC and the Restatement 
(Third) of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 659, 705 (1988). 
 31. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).  This case involves the standard 
competitive bidding scenario where a general contractor is obliged to rely on the bids of 
subcontractors in preparing his own proposal to the prime contractor.  Workarounds, such as 
making the use of the bid consideration for an irrevocable offer, or actually forming a contract 
contingent on winning the bid, are awkward.  So the reliance imbedded in this scenario makes 
promissory estoppel a compelling claim. 
 32. See, e.g., E.A. Coronis Assocs. v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 216 A.2d 246, 249, 251 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966) (explaining that plaintiff’s writing did not constitute a 2-205 offer, but 
that promissory estoppel could still apply); see also Gibson, supra note 30, at 704–06 (explaining 
that the advent of Drennan has caused courts to ignore 2-205). 
 33. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. 
Kan. 2000).  The court in ProCD explains that the term shrinkwrap emanates “from the fact that 
retail software packages are covered in plastic or cellophane ‘shrinkwrap’ and some vendors . . . 
have written licenses that become effective as soon as the customer tears the wrapping from the 
package.”  ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449. 
 34. Section 2-207(1) permits parties to form an agreement even where the acceptance 
includes new or different terms that prevent the agreement from matching up precisely with the 
offer, thereby rejecting the mirror-image rule.  U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (2011).  Section 2-207(2) 
refuses to automatically incorporate the terms of the last sent document.  Id. § 2-207(2). 
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assent to the last transmitted terms—the “last shot.”35  Article 2 rejects this 
characterization.36   
A substantial body of case law has developed to resolve a problem created 
by the structure of section 2-207.37  Although characterized as the Code’s 
solution to the “battle of the forms,” the section specifically applies to new or 
different terms in either acceptances or confirmations.38  Where the parties 
make an oral agreement and later trade confirmations containing new or 
different terms, courts have employed the “knockout rule” to administer 
conflicting terms.39  The terms cancel each other out and, if necessary, the gaps 
are filled per 2-207(3).40   
A similar yet distinct problem arises where different terms (i.e., conflicting 
versus just new) are introduced in an acceptance rather than in conflicting 
confirmations.  This is a different case because it raises the question of whether 
the terms of the offer should be privileged under 2-207.  Stated differently, 
should we allow the offeree to put conflicting terms in his acceptance and use 
the knockout rule to eliminate undesirable terms in the offer, while still binding 
the offeror.41   
                                                 
 35. Section 2-207 rejected this construction and presumed instead that commercial traders 
were not negotiating terms in this “battle of the forms.”  Indeed, they were not even reading them. 
See PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES, supra note 28, at 54 (explaining that many sales contracts 
are not understandingly signed).  Traders were using them as a convenient vehicle to transmit a 
few core dickered terms.  Id.  In this context, the common law last-shot rule was just a snare and 
section 2–207 defused this trap.  See id. at 55–56. 
 36. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 163–64 (4th ed. 2004) (describing how 2-207 
reshaped the battle of the forms). 
 37. John E. Murray, Jr., The Definitive “Battle of the Forms”: Chaos Revisited, 20 J.L. & 
COM. 1, 5 (2000). 
 38. Comment 1 to § 2-207 explains that 
[t]his section is intended to deal with two typical situations.  The one is the written 
confirmation, where an agreement has been reached either orally or by informal 
correspondence between the parties and is followed by one or both of the parties 
sending formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding 
terms not discussed. 
U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (2011). 
 39. See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579 (10th Cir. 1984);  
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Sonic Dev. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 533, 538 (D. Kan. 1982). 
 40. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6; see also Daitom, 741 F.2d at 1579 (noting that  
gap-filler approaches find support in Comment 6 to section 2-207). 
 41. Answering the question requires appreciation of an important distinction.  It is one thing 
to permit the offeree to bind the deal with an assent that adds minor additional terms.  It is 
significantly different to bind the offeror where some of his explicitly drafted terms have been 
canceled out by conflicting terms in the acceptance. 
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The majority of cases apply the knockout rule uniformly to both scenarios42 
even though the textual and policy justifications for applying it to acceptances 
are qualitatively weaker than the justification for applying it to confirmations.43    
The shrinkwrap cases are a more drastic example of counter-textual 
interpretations. These are cases where the trade ocurred over the Internet, or 
the telephone, with the customer ordering the product, paying by credit card, 
and the seller shipping the item.  ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg44 and Hill v. 
Gateway 200045 are prominent illustrations of the category.  Judge Frank 
Easterbrook wrote both opinions,46 responding to the argument that section  
2-207 prevents the enforcement of the fine print contract that comes in the box 
with a new computer.  When the item arrives there is a long contract with 
many terms that the buyer sees for the first time.  The two Easterbrook 
opinions involve contracts with a term requiring arbitration of disputes (which 
denies buyers with small grievances the advantages of class action litigation).  
Under a traditional application of section 2-207, the terms in the box would be 
considered new terms in a subsequent written confirmation and would fall out 
of the agreement because it is a consumer transaction.47  
  ProCD and Hill take the opposite view.  Judge Easterbrook’s approach to 
the problem is a model of common law creativity.  First he plays rough in 
characterizing the transaction.  Most people would say,48 and affiliated legal 
rules would presume,49 that the buyer is making an offer to  
                                                 
 42. See Daitom, 741 F.2d at 1579–80.  The “vast majority” of jurisdictions follow the 
Daitom approach.  See, e.g., Reilly Foam Corp. v. Rubbermaid Corp., 206 F. Supp. 2d 643, 655 
(E.D. Pa. 2002). 
 43. Comment 6 to section 2-207 refers only to confirmations and prescribes the knockout 
rule where parties follow an oral agreement by trading confirmations that contain conflicting 
terms.  U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6; see also Caroline N. Brown, Restoring Peace in the Battle of the 
Forms: A Framework for Making Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207 Work, 69 N.C. L. 
REV. 893, 941–42 (1991) (arguing that section 2-207 privileges the terms of the offer and that the 
knockout rule should be limited to confirmations due to a difference in the relationship of the 
parties exchanging confirmations as opposed to the offeror-offeree relationship). 
 44. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 45. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 46. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148; ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1448. 
 47. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2011) (stating that new terms fall out of the contract except 
where both parties are merchants).  Even there, the new terms will fall out if they constitute 
material alterations, if the offeror objects to them, or if the offeror has objected to any new terms 
in his offer.  Id. § 2-207(2)(a)–(c). 
 48. Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340 (D. Kan. 2000) (“In typical 
consumer transactions, the purchaser is the offeror, and the vendor is the offeree.”). 
 49. For example, because of the rule that advertisements typically are not deemed to be 
offers, it follows that it is the buyer who is making an offer to purchase.  See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. 
Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 86 N.W.2d 689, 690–91 (Minn. 1957).  In that context, the 
advertisement is defined as a solicitation of offers.  Id. at 690. 
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purchase.50  Judge Easterbrook rejects this construction.51  Instead, he says that 
the seller is the offeror and, as the master of its offer, can condition the buyer’s 
acceptance however it likes.52  This includes the stipulation that the buyer’s 
retention of the machine for a specified period constitutes acceptance of the list 
of written terms that come in the box.53   
This interpretation flatly mischaracterizes 2-207.  Judge Easterbrook glibly 
dismisses it as applicable only to the “battle of the forms”54 even though the 
text clearly applies to written confirmations that follow an oral agreement, and 
countless cases affirm this plain meaning.55  Judge Easterbrook’s approach has 
earned a wide following.56  
Modification - Section 2-209 governs contract modifications.57  It 
fundamentally departs from the common law by eliminating the requirement 
that modifications be supported by consideration—essentially repudiating the 
pre-existing duty rule.58  Interpretations of section 2-209 establish an anchor 
point for our spectrum of examples because they are less evidently 
repudiations of the text and are fair efforts to resolve a puzzle inherent in the 
text.  The puzzle is in the oscillating message of 2-209.  Section 2-209(1) 
liberalizes the methodology for modifying a contract for the sale of goods by 
                                                 
 50. The district court understandably concluded in ProCD that a contract is formed when 
the consumer pays for the software.  ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450. 
 51. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149 (citing ProCD and explaining that the vendor may solicit 
acceptance by conduct and that, therefore, ProCD applied to computer shrinkwrap licenses). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.  Judge Easterbrook adds to this what may be the better 
explanation for his efforts.  As a matter of policy, he believes that applying 2-207 would 
introduce tremendous inefficiencies.  Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149 (“Practical considerations support 
allowing vendors to enclose the full terms with their products.”). 
 54. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 (explaining that, “when there is only one form, ‘Section 2-207 is 
irrelevant’” (quoting ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452)). 
 55. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (2011).  The first sentence to Comment 1 to 2-207 explains that 
[t]his section is intended to deal with two typical situations.  The one is the written 
confirmation, where an agreement has been reached either orally or by informal 
correspondence between the parties and is followed by one or both of the parties 
sending formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding 
terms not discussed. 
Id. at cmt. 1. 
 56. See, e.g., I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328,  
337–38 (D. Mass. 2002); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571–72 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1998); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 312–13 (Wash. 
2000). 
 57. U.C.C. § 2-209. 
 58. Id. § 2-209(1).  The pre-existing duty rule states that “a promise to pay a party an 
additional amount to do that which he already has prior contractual or other legal duty to do is not 
binding and is unenforceable for want of consideration.”  Corneill A. Stephens, Abandoning the 
Pre-Existing Duty Rule: Eliminating the Unnecessary, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 355, 356 (2008). 
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eliminating the consideration requirement.59  Paragraph (2), reinforced by the 
reference to the statute of frauds in paragraph (3), cuts back against the liberal 
modification standard of paragraph (1) by making a no oral modification 
(NOM) clause enforceable.  This reverses the common law rule that permits 
traders to orally rescind a NOM clause even the very instant after they execute 
it.  Paragraph (4) cuts back again toward greater freedom to modify, with the 
declaration that a failed modification—i.e., an oral modification in the face of a 
NOM clause—still might be enforceable as a “waiver.”60   
So after a zig and a zag, the resulting textual puzzle is what to make of the 
final zig—i.e., what is the character of the 2-209(4) “waiver” that has the 
potential to nullify the writing requirement of 2-209(2) and (3).  The dominant 
answer is important for our purposes, because it is a counter-textual 
construction in classic common law style.  It is the eminently sensible insertion 
of a reliance filter, famously employed by Judge Posner in Wisconsin Knife 
Works v. National Metal Crafters.61  To the question, what is the nature of this 
waiver that essentially validates an otherwise failed modification (i.e., an oral 
modification following a NOM clause), Judge Posner answers that only those 
failed modifications on which the claimant has relied shall qualify as 
waivers.62  Intuitively this seems like a quite effective filter against false 
assertions of modification.  The only problem is there is absolutely nothing in 
the text that supports it.63  The alternative view, advanced in Judge 
Easterbrook’s dissent, solves the puzzle by employing traditional definitions of 
modification and waiver, and thus hews more closely to the interpretative 
instructions in the Code’s general administrative provisions.64  Both of these 
approaches respond to textual ambiguity.65  The differences between them help 
map legitimate—or illegitimate—responses to textual ambiguity.  
Requirements and Output Contracts - Section 2-306, governing 
requirements and output contracts, explicitly states that no amount 
unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or to any normal or 
otherwise comparable output or requirements may be tendered or demanded.66  
                                                 
 59. Compare U.C.C. § 2-209(1), with Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102 
(9th Cir. 1902) (highlighting the common law requirement of additional consideration in order to 
modify an existing contract). 
 60. U.C.C. § 2-209(4). 
 61. 781 F.2d 1280, 1287 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing section 2-209 waivers and oral 
modifications). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (omitting reliance as a factor to consider). 
 64. Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1290–91 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“At common law 
‘waiver’ means an intentional relinquishment of a known right.  A person may relinquish a right 
by engaging in conduct inconsistent with the right or by a verbal or written declaration.”). 
 65. Id. at 1284. 
 66. U.C.C. § 2-306(1). 
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For what may turn out to be very good reasons, courts and prominent 
commentators have rejected this plain statutory command and advanced 
instead the view that, while 2-306 is good and correct policy for 
disproportionate increases, disproportionate decreases, even to zero, are 
broadly allowable.67   
Adequate Assurances - Section 2-609 administers the right to adequate 
assurances of performance.  This gives the promisee, with grounds for 
insecurity about the promisor’s capacity or willingness to perform later, a 
response short of suspending performance68 or charging the promisor with 
anticipatory breach—which if mishandled, might allow the charge that the 
promisee himself has repudiated.69  Where reasonable grounds for insecurity 
arise, section 2-609 allows the promisee to “in writing demand adequate 
assurance of due performance.”70 Notwithstanding this plain requirement, 
courts have dispensed with the writing requirement in a variety of cases.71 
II.  WARRING IMPULSES AND CONSTRUCTION OF ARTICLE 2 
Interpretation of Article 2 is confounded by the conflicting impulses at its 
core.  Structurally, it is statutory.  But substantively, it is intertwined with the 
common law of contract.72  It is no wonder then that judges extend the familiar 
habits of mind and modes of analysis that serve so well in the purely common 
law context to the very similar questions that emerge under Article 2.73  While 
some cases do in fact turn on deference to the Code as statute,74 often the 
institutional principles and policies that generally guide statutory interpretation 
are treated as subordinate or go entirely unmentioned. 
This Part will elaborate on the competing claims for constraint and license in 
interpreting the Code and will argue that minimum respect for the institutional 
principles of public law-making requires fidelity to statutory commands that 
are textually and circumstantially unambiguous.  Section A evaluates the case 
for liberal, common law style interpretation of the Code.  Section B shows why 
the Code and particularly Article 2 must be taken seriously as statute and 
elaborates the minimum requirements of that enterprise.   
                                                 
 67. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 24, at 464 (citing various cases where disproportionate 
decreases were allowed so long as they were made in good faith). 
 68. U.C.C. § 2-609. 
 69. Id. at cmt. 2. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. § 2-609(1). 
 72. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (dealing with the 
complications that arise in applying Article 2 against ProCD’s precedent). 
 73. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 16 (discussing common law inertia). 
 74. See, e.g., Wright v. Bank of Cal., 276 Cal. App. 2d 485, 490 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) 
(stating “[t]he plain language of the statute cannot be varied by reference to the [C]omments”). 
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A.  The Textual Invitation to Liberal Interpretation 
Statutory construction requires judgments about textual meaning and 
adjustments for problems not precisely anticipated by the text.75  It is widely 
acknowledged that something might be within the letter but outside the spirit 
of the statute.76  Moreover, some statutes explicitly anticipate that courts and 
agencies will do the real work of law-making.77  On the other hand, judicial 
decisions that explicitly repudiate plain textual instructions are highly suspect 
and difficult to justify under any theory of interpretation.78   
Perhaps the best justifications for the interpretations of Article 2 lie within 
the nature of the Code itself.  The general administrative provisions of the 
Code—detailed in Article 1—seem to encourage the idea that this statutory 
system should be administered with special flexibility.  The principally 
relevant sections are 1-102 and 1-103.  These are treated below in sections 1 
and 2.  The impact of these two sections is complicated by recent revisions of 
Article 1, which has been adopted in varying forms in thirty-seven states.79 
1.  The Statutory UCC? Interpretative License Under Section 1-102 
In section 1-102(1), judges are invited to construe the Code liberally and to 
apply the Code so as to “promote its underlying purposes and policies.”80   
Explicitly those policies are: 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions;  
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices 
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;  
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.81 
These instructions contain some ambiguity.  There is an evident conflict 
between the simplicity, clarity, and uniformity goals of subsections (a) and (c), 
                                                 
 75. Gedid, supra note 11, at 347–49. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Statutes like the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act direct agencies to create 
entire regulatory programs that are the principle source of controlling legal rules.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601 (2006). 
 78. See infra Part II.B.1.  Whether broad commands in the Comments indicate that courts 
should take more liberty with the Code than with statutes that manifestly grant less interpretative 
discretion is a separate issue.  Within the boundaries of the delegation doctrine, it is entirely 
appropriate for courts to operate creatively within the range set by the legislature.  See generally 
Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323 (1987). 
 79. Keith A. Rowley, U.C.C. Legislative Update, COMMERCIAL LAW (March 2, 2010, 5:00 
PM) http://ucclaw.blogspot.com/2010/03/ucc-legislative-update.html. 
 80. U.C.C. § 1-102 (2006).  White and Summers explain that section 1-106, which states 
that Code remedies should be liberally construed, “is in the same spirit as 1-102.”  WHITE & 
SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 18. 
 81. U.C.C. § 1-102. 
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and the expansion of commercial practices through custom and usage aims of 
subsection (b).82  Still, section 1-102 seems like a fair license for courts 
looking to employ common law methodologies and improve upon the results 
dictated by the text.  Subsection (b) particularly frames the Code as an ongoing 
collaboration between courts and the legislature to incorporate changes in 
commercial practices and expectations.83  Moreover, the illustrations of  
this—the interpretative enterprise elaborated in the comments—read very 
much like common law law-making.84 
But can every counter-textual adjustment of Article 2 be explained as a 
response to the invitation of 1-102?85  One stated goal of 1-102 is 
simplification and clarification of commercial law.86  It is difficult to argue that 
common law adjustments repudiating statutory text simplify things.  In some 
ways, especially for uncounseled and undercounseled traders, it promises 
exactly the opposite.  The text is still nominally the law.  So it is principally 
members of the lawyers club and their clients who will appreciate the implicit 
asterisk at the end of the text signaling that the real result is actually opposite 
of what the words say.   
The goal of expansion of commercial practices through custom and usage 
and agreement of the parties poses different burdens for activist courts.  The 
primary burden is a question of fact.  Do courts that advance  
counter-textual interpretations actually consider whether their departures from 
the statute are facilitating the expansion of commercial practices through 
custom and usage, or are they just employing the free-sweeping modalities of 
the common law out of habit?  As a threshold matter the first justification is 
sound, the second is not.87  
Because counter-textual adjustments develop case-by-case, common law 
style, they ultimately conflict with the goal of uniformity in section 1-102(c).88  
Departures from the text are the classic fodder for jurisdictional splits and 
academic disputes over whether some measure or another is an improvement 
of already settled legislative text and policy.  So broad judicial license taken 
                                                 
 82. Id.  Simplicity and clarity are consistent with the statutory enterprise of democratization, 
while the expansion of custom and usage requires the insiders’ view, the common law process. 
 83. Id. § 1-102(2)(b). 
 84. See supra text accompanying notes 48–65. 
 85. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 18 n.87 (suggesting that some cases have given 
section 1-102 a “life of its own”). 
 86. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 19 (explaining 
that courts and lawyers will interpret the Code according to its “underlying rationales,” which will 
lead to uniformity and predictability). 
 87. Note, Custom and Trade Usage: Its Application to Commercial Dealings and the 
Common Law, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1192, 1206 (1955) (noting that deviations from the common 
law through custom and usage are permitted, but blind adherence to common practices contrary to 
statute are not). 
 88. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 16, 18–19. 
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with the Code recreates a problem that the Code, and before that the  “Uniform 
Acts,” were aimed to fix.89  Under the Uniform Acts, as the case law grew, so 
developed “gaps and uncertainties . . . in direct proportion to the number of 
published opinions and this caused a breakdown of our commercial case-law 
system.”90  
The drafters of the Code have attempted to aid the interpretative enterprise 
with “Official Comments.”91  Although “the enacting jurisdictions did not 
enact these [C]omments,”92 if credited, the Comments to section 1-102 offer 
broad support for aggressive, text-altering interpretations.93  One of the most 
expansive invitations is in Comment 1, which counsels that as a  
“semi-permanent piece of legislation,” the Code is designed to evolve with 
changes in commercial practices.94  The engines for that change are courts, 
lawyers, and litigants who will press the Code to evolve in response to new 
circumstances.95    
According to Comment 1, courts are authorized to apply provisions of the 
Code to “subject matter which was not expressly included in the language of 
the act,”96 to impose provisions of the Code “even where the subject-matter 
had been intentionally excluded from the act in general [to] implement a 
statutory policy with liberal and useful remedies not provided in the statutory 
text.”97  The interpretative license granted by these examples, if fully 
credited,98 exceeds anything that can be fairly drawn purely from the text of  
1-102.  The Comments plausibly endorse, “not x” interpretations of statutory 
                                                 
 89. See, e.g., Robyn L. Meadows, Code Arrogance and Displacement of Common Law and 
Equity: A Defense of Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 535, 535 
nn.2–3 (2001) (indicating that, although the UCC’s aim was clarity and certainty, jurisdictions 
and scholars have differing opinions on its predictability). 
 90. William D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial “Code” Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 291, 296 (1962) (discussing the case law system at the end of the nineteenth century); see 
also Karl Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 367,  
370–71 (1957) (describing similar problems with the Uniform Acts). 
 91. See Hawkland, supra note 90, at 375. 
 92. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 2. 
 93. Id. at 18–19. 
 94. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (2001) (stating that the Act was drawn to provide flexibility to 
adjust to emerging and unanticipated practices and circumstances). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (citing Commercial Nat’l Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust 
Co., 239 U.S. 520, 528–29 (1916)). 
 97. Id. (citing Agar v. Orda, 190 N.E. 479, 481 (N.Y. 1934)). 
 98. See supra notes 91–97 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance and the nature 
of the Comments). 
2012] The Statutory UCC: Interpretative License and Duty 1089 
term “x,” making a strong case for nearly unlimited interpretative discretion.99  
As prominent commentators explain, “most courts follow the [C]omments.”100 
There is, however, a problem.  Taking too much interpretative license from 
the Comments is not only at odds with fidelity to the text, it is also problematic 
purely within the parameters of the Code itself.101  It is widely acknowledged 
that the Comments can depart sharply from the text, either expanding or 
contracting it.102  The reason is troubling.  White and Summers explain, “[t]he 
explanation for this is partly political.  When opponents of a draft section 
prevailed against the drafters, the drafters would sometimes revise the draft 
accordingly, but seek to preserve the old draft in the Comments.”103 
It should be no surprise that political and policy disagreements afflict the 
Comments.  This is a pervasive problem in the development of formal 
legislative history.104  Kent Greenawalt notes that “everyone has long since 
discovered that the history is now important . . . .  This creates a powerful 
incentive to stack the legislative history.  If one wants a particular result, it is 
much easier to insert language in a committee report than to alter the language 
of the statute.”105  
The idea of the Comments as quasi-legislative history invites strong 
normative criticism.  John Manning argues that the use of legislative history in 
statutory interpretation offends the separation of powers by delegating to one 
part of the legislature authority over what the statute means.106  Manning’s 
objection to using legislative history, even where it reflects honest efforts by 
legislators to communicate with one another about developing laws, has been 
criticized.107  But even critics concede that Manning’s objection has “special 
force when legislators self-consciously employ legislative history to resolve 
statutory meaning for the executive branch and the judiciary.”108   
                                                 
 99. NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 52:5 (7th ed. 2008). 
 100. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 14. 
 101. See, e.g., id. at 13; see also supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 102. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 13 (citing Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on 
the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 597, 621–27 (1966)). 
 103. Id. (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 782 
(1953)). 
 104. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 641–44 
(1990) (expounding upon different issues that pervade legislative histories and the reliability of 
statutory interpretation based on comments and committee reports). 
 105. GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 181. 
 106. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM L. REV. 673, 675 
(1997) (arguing that this process bypasses the requirements of bicameral enactment and 
presentment to the President). 
 107. GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 184. 
 108. Id. 
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Within Manning’s critique, elevation of the Official Code Comments is an 
even more offensive case of illegitimate delegation.109  Use of the Comments 
to justify counter-textual interpretations is far worse than delegating to one part 
of the legislature power to say what the statute means.110  The Comments 
generally have not been adopted by legislatures, often were not even presented 
to lawmakers111 and, in some cases, did not even exist when the states enacted 
the Code into law.112  Also, the Comment drafters, unlike legislative staffers, 
are remote in time and venue, and they are totally unaffiliated with the 
legislature.  So the entire enterprise is far worse than the delegation of  
law-making to some privileged legislative clique that Manning complains 
about.113    
All this notwithstanding, White and Summers report that it is only the 
“exceptional” case where a court has refused to follow a comment at variance 
with the text.114  A summary by one of Manning’s critics provides context: 
[n]either Congress as a whole nor the courts could allow a committee 
to write authoritative statutory language that was not adopted by 
Congress and the President.  It follows that no one can authorize 
committees to determine the meaning in committee reports that are 
not adopted by Congress as a whole.115 
It is a giant step further to trump statutory text with commentary from people 
with no connection at all to the legislature and whose views are sometimes not 
even presented to lawmakers.116  
2.  Interpretative License Under Section 1-103 
One argument for counter-textual interpretations is that the UCC is not a 
traditional statute.  True, it is not purely the work of the legislature.  With the 
hard work of drafting done by others, arguably legislatures are doing little 
more than rubber-stamping.  Indeed, questions of Code meaning are widely 
                                                 
 109. Id. at 185. 
 110. Id. at 184–85. 
 111. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 14.  White and Summers’ response to this 
shortcoming is dismissive, claiming that the Code is “highly technical ‘lawyers law’” and that, if 
a voting legislator did not understand a provision when it was enacted, it is unlikely that he would 
understand its comments.  Id. 
 112. Id. at 14.  There have been fifteen “post-enactment” commentaries on the Code drafted 
by the Permanent Editorial Board for the Code.  Id. at 14–15. 
 113. See GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 185–86 (declaring, “Manning’s argument is at its 
most powerful when courts rely on a committee report or the deliberations of one chamber.”). 
 114. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 14. 
 115. See GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 188. 
 116. See Manning, supra note 106, at 673. 
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addressed by reference to remote drafters.  We still ask, what was Llewellyn’s 
view and attach real importance to the answer.117 
As a uniform law, the Code is unsuited to random, customized amendments 
that require legislative policymaking.  This hints that something different from 
traditional legislation is happening; that the Code is not expected to evolve in 
the traditional way of textual amendment and, therefore, that strict fidelity to 
the text is an unsuitable methodology.118  White and Summers tell us that strict 
fidelity to the text is essentially a novel theory, and certainly not reflected in 
the interpretative work of courts.  
Some theorists believe the Code is a “true Code” and therefore 
would hold that every case must be resolved in light of the text itself, 
prior interpretations to the contrary notwithstanding.  We find no 
evidence that courts are generally departing from the notion of stare 
decisis in this way.119 
Stepping back, this is quite a remarkable observation because there is a total 
absence of any formal institutional or constitutional authorization for treating 
the Code as some type of hybrid, non-statutory statute.  Still, it is easy to 
understand how judges, engaging questions that oscillate between statutory and 
common law modes, would gravitate toward the relative freedom of analysis 
available under the common law.  Indeed, there are structural aspects of the 
Code that seem to compel this approach.120  One issue is that the Code does not 
even purport to cover all aspects of transactions that are generally within its 
reach.  White and Summers note that the Code “includes several innovative 
provisions on the formation of sales contracts, but it still leaves most issues of 
contract formation to general contract law.”121 
                                                 
 117. See Symposium, Origins and Evolution: Drafters Reflect Upon the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 535, 603–05 (1982). 
 118. See, e.g., Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 622–23, 632 (1975); Symposium, supra note 117, at 606. 
 119. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 11 (citing Hawkland, supra note 90, at  
291–93).  The reference to a “true Code” here refers explicitly to William Hawkland’s distinction 
between ordinary legislation and a broadly preemptive civil Code.  Hawkland, supra note 90, at 
292.  The term “true Code” symbolizes the developed treatment of the UCC as a hybrid statute 
that is broadly susceptible to common law style interpretation.  Id.; see also Robert A. Hillman, 
Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code: UCC Section 1-103 and “Code” Methodology, 
18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 655, 657 (1977) (stating that under the “true Code” approach, the 
Code’s “purposes and policies should dictate the result even where there is no express language 
on the point”); Jenkins, supra note 13, at 498–99 (describing the Code as a hybrid). 
 120. See Danzig, supra note 118, at 626–27, 632–33. 
 121. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 7.  One example is section 2-403, governing 
title and right to transfer goods.  U.C.C. § 2-403 (2011).  Operation of this section depends on the 
difference between void and voidable title, forcing courts to turn to the common law to make that 
determination.  Note, supra note 10, at 539.  Other examples include section 2-302.  See U.C.C.  
§ 2-302 (permitting invalidation of contracts for unconscionability, but evidently invoking the 
common law definition of unconscionability). 
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A broader endorsement of the same point is general administrative section  
1-103.  It confirms Grant Gilmore’s assessment that the Code “derives from 
the common law [and] assumes the continuing existence of a large body of  
pre-Code and non-Code law on which it rests for support [without which the 
Code] could not survive.”122  White and Summers call section 1-103 “probably 
the most important single provision in the Code.”123  Section 1-103 confirms 
that courts interpreting the Code are operating in a constellation of conflicting 
prompts.  The Code supplants common law instructions where indicated.124  
Otherwise, courts are instructed to refer back to the common law toolkit.125  It 
is a difficult recipe in the sense that substantively these are very similar 
enterprises, but procedurally they are vastly different.126  The cognitive burden 
of shifting back and forth between textual fidelity and common law free reign 
as Code questions oscillate from statutory to common law is manifestly 
tedious.127  This may provide an explanation for the liberties courts and 
commentators take with the statutory text.128      
But whether it is a complete and satisfactory justification for these liberties 
is another question.  Any interpretative guidance in the Code is entirely 
trumped by the constitutional principles that constrain statutory 
interpretation.129  There is no basis for claiming that the legislature has ceded 
its constitutionally mandated function and powers to the Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute.130  Nor can the Code be 
classified as some peculiar hybrid or low-level legislative  
rubber-stamping of the policy judgments of remote drafters.   
Enactment of the Code always has meant traditional exercise of legislative 
power and policy-making.  Procedurally there is no basis for any claim to the 
                                                 
 122. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 8 (quoting Grant Gilmore, Article 9: What It 
Does for the Past, 26 LA. L. REV. 285, 285–86 (1966)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 495–96, 507. 
 125. Id. at 506.  This prompts the argument that the Code is special and that common law 
approaches to Code interpretation are justified.  Section 1-103 underscores the fact that courts 
interpreting the Code are operating in a world of dual impulses and thus will take great liberties 
with the statutory language.  Id. at 505–06. 
 126. Judges have far more discretion on common law questions than in statutory 
interpretation.  See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 
GEO. L.J. 341, 341–47 (2008). 
 127. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 9. 
 128. But see Hawkland, supra note 90, at 312.  Hawkland makes an important distinction 
when emphasizing that section 1-103 explicitly anticipates that principles of law and equity shall 
only “supplement” the Code.  Id.  This is consistent, says Hawkland, with a view of the Code as a 
classically preemptive codification, covering the entire field, such that “outside law has only mere 
supplementary force.”  Id. at 313. 
 129. See Scott, supra note 126, at 347 n.25. 
 130. Indeed, in the UCC’s history, all state legislatures enacted the Code through legitimate 
legislative processes.  See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 4. 
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contrary.  Even as a purely practical matter, there is broad evidence that 
legislatures engaged the policy changes advanced by the proffered text in the 
traditional fashion.131  The initial enactment of the Code, after nearly a decade 
of work by the drafters, generated intense scrutiny by states and a variety of 
policy responses.132  New York, for example, submitted the 1952 Official Text 
to the New York State Law Revision Commission for policy evaluation.133  
The Commission studied it for two years and recommended against adopting 
the Code unless it was substantially revised.134  In response to this and other 
commentary, revised versions of the Code appeared in 1958 and 1962.135  As 
the Code worked its way through legislatures, states made hundreds of 
amendments to it,136 rewriting and deleting substantial portions and 
undercutting in various ways the goal of uniformity.137   
Another example of legislative engagement is in the text of the Code 
itself.138  The text provides optional sections in many contexts that require 
legislatures to choose between competing approaches or create new ones.  
A more striking illustration of legislative policy engagement appears in the 
response to Revised Article 2.  Far from rubber-stamping it as with other 
sections,139 states have refused to adopt it.140  The reasons are complex but 
undoubtedly include substantial policy objections to parts of Article 2.141  
During the drafting process, various powerful interests complained about parts 
of the text and comments,142 arguing that the Revised Article 2 embodied 
flawed policy choices.143  That these concerns have become obstacles to 
enactment illustrates that legislatures are engaging policy questions here in the 
familiar way.  This shows legislatures operating in traditional fashion, 
rendering judgments about policy and text that cannot be diminished on the 
view that the Code is merely a rubber-stamped uniform law or is otherwise 
unworthy of the deference that statutory text generally commands. 
                                                 
 131. See id. at 3–5, 8–9. 
 132. See id. at 8 (indicating that fifteen years after the “1952 Official Text” had been 
published, approximately 775 separate amendments to the Code had been passed). 
 133. Id. at 3–4. 
 134. Id. at 4. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 8.  Article 9 was a particular concern for most states with 47 out of 54 of its 
sections being amended within fifteen years after the Code’s publication.  Id. at 8–9. 
 137. Id. at 9. 
 138. See id. at 8–9. 
 139. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 140. PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES, supra note 28, § 1-1, at 43 n.1. 
 141. See Symposium, supra note 117, at 606. 
 142. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 7.  These interest groups included automobile 
manufacturers, advertisers, and computer companies.  Id. 
 143. Id. 
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Code drafters and commentators may be forgiven for their forgetfulness.  
Their agenda renders state constitutional principles a secondary consideration.  
But that agenda is not and cannot be the agenda that governs the duties of 
judges interpreting legislation.  Judges have superseding obligations that 
reflect explicit institutional obligations within the scheme of separation of 
powers.144  While the polices that drive the Code are important components of 
the commercial world, the duties and prerogatives of the three branches of 
government go to the foundation of our social contract.145 
Finally, as a purely textual matter, one must recognize that section 1-103 
allows only that non-displaced principles of common law and equity shall 
“supplement” the provisions of the Code.146  William Hawkland commented 
early on that this constrains interpretation of the Code.147  Arguably, it permits 
a quite different and more limited methodology than we have now.   
Counter-textual interpretations proceed as if section 1-103 invites courts to 
supplant—rather than supplement—the Code with common law  
policy-making.148  Commentary during the revision of Article 1 speaks to the 
same point. 
3.  Revised Section 1-103 and Comment 2 
The official text of Revised Article 1 was approved in 2001149 and, so far, 
thirty-seven states have adopted it.150  In the revision, original section 1-102 
became section 1-103(a),151 and original section 1-103 became section  
1-103(b).152  This consolidation moved toward resolution of a core conflict that 
confounded questions of interpretation under the Code when applying original 
section 1-102 in conjunction with original section 1-103.153  While original 
section 1-102 suggested that the meaning of explicit Code provisions should be 
                                                 
 144. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 524–25 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961); see also Scott, supra note 126, at 410 n.364. 
 145. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, Judicial Review and the Right to Resist, 97 GEO. L.J. 61,  
85–86 (2002) (describing the balance of power between the three branches of the federal 
government and their evolution from the Social Contract). 
 146. U.C.C. § 1-103 (2011). 
 147. See Hawkland, supra note 90, at 312–15. 
 148. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 149. U.C.C. Art. I. 
 150. Rowley, supra note 79. 
 151. U.C.C. § 1-103.  This section gives general interpretative guidance that the Code should 
be construed to promote its underlying policies.  Id. § 1-103(a). 
 152. Id. § 1-103.  This section states that non-displaced principles of common law and equity 
shall supplement the Code.  Id. § 1-103(b). 
 153. Kathleen Patchel & Boris Auerbach, The Article 1 Revision Process, 54 SMU L. REV. 
603, 605–06 (2001) (“The Revision combines the purposes and policies provisions of Section  
1-102 and the supplemental principles of law provision of Section 1-103 in Revised Section  
1-103 to reflect the interrelationship between these principles of construction.”). 
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determined in light of the purposes and policies of that particular section and 
those underlying the entire UCC,154 original section 1-103 invited 
supplementation of the Code with other law that was not “displaced” by the 
Code.155  Determining what law was displaced by the Code and what law 
should supplement the Code continued to challenge courts.156  Revised Article 
1 suggested a resolution. The Chair of the Article 1 Revision Committee 
explained:  
the little guidance given by the comments as to what is meant by 
other law being “displaced” by the Code seems to create an 
inconsistency between [Section 1-102 and Section 1-103].  While 
Comment 1 to current Section 1-102 states that Code provisions must 
be applied in light of their underlying purposes and policies, 
Comment 1 to current Section 1-103 states that supplemental bodies 
of law continue to apply “except insofar as they are explicitly 
displaced by this Act.”  The addition of the qualifier “explicitly” in 
the comment could be read to suggest that other law is not displaced 
unless the text of the Code expressly says so.  That reading, however, 
would create a rigid rule at odds with [Section 1-102]. . . . 
 The Drafting Committee considered several reformulations of the 
text of current Section 1-103 . . . .  Ultimately, however, the 
Committee decided that the problem could best be resolved, not by 
changing the text, but by combining the relevant parts of the two 
sections and providing a new comment to give better guidance as to 
circumstances under which other law is displaced.  Comment 2 to 
revised Section 1-103 sets out the basic principle that other law is 
displaced if that other law is inconsistent with either the text or the 
underlying purposes and policies of the relevant Code provisions.157 
                                                 
 154. Id. at 605. 
 155. Id. at 605–06. 
 156. Id. at 606–07. 
 157. Id.  Sara Jenkins, Chair of the ABA Subcommittee on UCC Article 1, puts it this way: 
[p]lacement of current Section 1-103 within current Section 1-102 supports a 
conclusion that supplementation by other law no longer stands on an equal footing with 
the purposes and policies delineated in Section 1-102, but rather, continued viability of 
supplemental law is now one of several policy goals that must be balanced rather than 
separately accommodated. 
Jenkins, supra note 13, at 507; see also Robyn L. Meadows, Code Arrogance and Displacement 
of Common Law and Equity, 54 SMU L. REV. 535, 541 (2001) (stating that the intent of 
combining sections 1-102 and 1-103 into revised section 1-103 was “to strengthen the preemptive 
reach of the Code and reduce courts’ reliance on common law and equity.” (citing U.C.C. § 1-102 
(Tentative Draft Apr. 1997))).  Jenkins summarized the boundaries of license and duty that an 
interpretative methodology of Code construction establishes for judges. 
[A] court confronted with an asserted unforeseen issue or context must ascertain, by 
reviewing the relevant article, whether the express language addresses the issue raised 
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This seems like a quite explicit constriction of any license for  
counter-textual interpretation that courts might draw explicitly from section  
1-103, its comments or implications.  It privileges the text and avoids  
counter-textual interpretations grounded in “other law” that conflict with the 
text of individual sections of the Code or with its broad principles and policies.  
Recall however, that in search of interpretative license, one of the most 
explicit endorsements of counter-textual interpretation appeared not in 
connection with section 1-103, but rather in the comments to section  
1-102.158  Comment 1 to original section 1-102 says:  
[Courts] have recognized the policies embodied in an act as 
applicable in reason to subject-matter which was not expressly 
included in the language of the act . . . .  They have done the same 
where reason and policy so required, even where the subject matter 
had been intentionally excluded from the act in general. . . . Nothing 
in this Act stands in the way of the continuance of such action by the 
courts.159   
This statement, which narratively and by citation seems to endorse  
counter-textual interpretations of the Code, continues on into revised section  
1-103 as Comment 1.160  So it is difficult to say that the question of  
counter-textual interpretations is decisively resolved by revised Article 1.  Of 
course Article 1 is far from the last word on this point. 
                                                                                                                 
for resolution.  If so, the express language is not supplanted by consistent or 
inconsistent supplementary law.  The text governs; supplementation is unwarranted.  
Resorting to supplementary principles would be impermissible unless some broader, 
general public policy or fundamental value necessitates policing the transaction or 
adjusting the equities between the parties. 
Jenkins, supra note 13, at 507–08. 
As an example of the interpretative methodology demanded by Revised Article 1, Jenkins cites In 
re Hoover, which applies Article 9 to determine priority of creditors claims to crops growing on 
leased land, but also permits lessor recovery in restitution for the uncompensated time the crops 
matured on his or her land.  Id. at 508 (citing 35 B.R. 432 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).  This example along 
with the broad guidance she describes seems to preclude direct counter-textual interpretations. 
The question is essentially where we should err in identifying counter-textual interpretations.  
Tipping that balance are principles of democratization and the influences of the information age.  
For several of the borderline questions, those influences push in the same direction as the Code’s 
explicit instructions.  Counter-textual interpretations complicating, for example, firm offers, 
statute of frauds, and parol evidence, confound the stated goals of the Code reflected in section  
1-103.  U.C.C. § 1-103.  Additionally, while making the Code a snare for the undercounseled, 
counter-textual interpretations amplify the role of lawyers even where the structure of contract 
counseling makes it cost prohibitive for many people to obtain counsel.  See supra notes 85–90 
and accompanying text. 
 158. Compare U.C.C. § 1-103 (2000) (identifying broad areas of law that supplement the 
provisions of the Code), with U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt.1 (2000) (discussing the specific rules of 
construction applicable to the Code). 
 159. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt.1 (citations omitted). 
 160. Compare id., with U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 1  (2011) (utilizing nearly identical language). 
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B.  Public Law Principles and Article 2 as Statute 
Interpretation of the Code and particularly Article 2 poses a range of 
interpretative questions.  In some contexts, the decision to privilege the views 
and commentary of the drafters or the Permanent Editorial Committee may be 
compelling.161  Like most legislation, the Code contains gaps and textual 
puzzles that may require external elaboration.162  Drawing it from sources that 
reflect thousands of hours of thought about the matter is imminently sensible.  
But many Code questions present no such gaps or puzzles and, although courts 
almost uniformly follow the comments, that decision is sometimes very 
problematic.163  
Courts typically follow the comments even where they run counter to the 
text, were not considered by the enacting legislature, or were created long after 
the legislature enacted the Code.164  White and Summers answer this criticism 
by observing that much of the Code is highly technical “lawyer’s law.”165 They 
reason: “If the average legislator who voted to enact the Code in a given state 
did not understand the intricacies of Article 4 or Article 9 at the time of 
enactment, it is likely he did not grasp the relevant comments either.”166  
Although this is not an empirical finding, one suspects it is largely true.  But 
even if legislators do vote for and against things that they do not understand 
and perhaps have not even read, the fiction that they operate at a higher level is 
an important, indeed vital, one.  One extension of that fiction is the fidelity that 
judges owe to the text that emerges from those legislative efforts.  This section 
will elaborate that obligation, emphasizing the institutional principles that 
make particular counter-textual interpretations of Article 2 very difficult to 
justify.167 
The explicit focus on Article 2 is purposeful.  The justifications for broad 
interpretative license are especially weak for Article 2, which has broader 
general application than other more specialized sections of the Code.168  
                                                 
 161. See Skilton, supra note 102, at 602–03.  Skilton identifies multiple reasons for using the 
Comments, including views that they are the legislative history of the Code, that they express the 
opinions of the Code’s drafters, and that they form a treatise that could stand on its own merits.  
Id. 
 162. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 13–14. 
 163. Id. at 14. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  Compare this with Llewellyn’s view that ignorance of commercial law was 
widespread and many “expert” commercial lawyers’ knowledge consisted of “smug flat 
ignorance.”  Statement of Karl N. Llewellyn to New York Law Revision Commission (1954), 
reprinted in WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 537 (1973); 
see also supra note 111. 
 166. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 14. 
 167. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 315 (2009) (demonstrating that courts look to 
statutory text and legislative history when interpreting statutes). 
 168. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 14. 
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Article 2 admits the strongest argument for democratization.  It is the Article 
that ordinary traders most often encounter.169  Many parts of it are not “highly 
technical ‘lawyer’s law.’”170  Many of its commands are basic commercial 
traffic signals that are easily accessed and understandable by the countless 
small traders who generally proceed uncounseled.  So especially for these 
common and plainly stated rules of the commercial road, interests of 
democratization and transparency reinforce the constitutional case against 
counter-textual interpretation. 
Subsection 1 will elaborate the state constitutional principles that demand 
fidelity to plain textual commands. Subsection 2 will present the policy 
argument that fidelity to plainly stated commercial rules of the road is 
especially important in the Internet age.  Subsection 3 makes the normative 
case against counter-textual interpretations, arguing that they are 
antidemocratic and strain boundaries of legitimacy. 
1. Statutory Construction, Legislative Supremacy, and Institutional Limits on 
Interpretative License   
Legislative supremacy is the core principle of statutory interpretation.171  
Professor Daniel Farber asserts that “[v]iolations of the supremacy principle 
are particularly serious because they impair the basic social norm of 
democratic self government.”172  It is tantamount and “a staple of democratic 
ideas that an elected legislature has priority in determining what shall be law, 
within any domains not removed from it according to a constitution.”173  This 
is such an accepted axiom that “the general contemporary view of statutory 
interpretation is that there is not a great deal to say about the subject.”174  The 
principle is so broadly accepted that “nothing else in law so important receives 
such little attention.”175  Of course, what actually constitutes a violation of 
legislative supremacy and what, on the other hand, constitutes proper 
interpretative license defies consensus.  But some basic things can be said for 
                                                 
 169. See What Is Article 2 of the U.C.C.?, LAWINFO, http://resources.lawinfo.com/en 
/Legal-FAQs/ucc-and-warranties/Federal/What-is-article-2-of-the-UCC.html (last visited Jun.  
17, 2012). 
 170. Yvonne W. Rosmarin, Consumers-R-Us: A Reality in the U.C.C. Article 2 Revision 
Process, 35 WM & MARY L. REV. 1593, 1593–95 (1994). 
 171. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (“Our individual appraisal of 
the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put 
aside in the process of interpreting a statute.  Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and 
its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end.”). 
 172. Farber, supra note 16, at 293. 
 173. GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 23. 
 174. Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 
35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213 (1983). 
 175. Id. at 233–34. 
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certain, and those things are enough to highlight the problem with  
counter-textual interpretations of Article 2. 
The “ultimate question” in statutory interpretation, says Daniel Farber, 
whose assessment is reprinted in Sutherland’s classic treatise Statutory 
Construction, is whether genuine doubt exists about the meaning of the text.176  
There are a variety of theoretical models for evaluating how judges should 
administer incomplete or ambiguous text.177  But if the legislative command is 
not in doubt “courts may not take action to the contrary . . . the court must give 
way, even if its own view of public policy is quite different.”178   
The principles underlying this basic idea are worth elaborating because they 
reveal an important question about judicial treatments of the Code.  There are 
two reasons why courts should follow the supremacy principle.  First, it is a 
basic and traditional part of judging in our legal culture,179 and “violations of 
the principle defeat justified expectations and impair legal stability.”180  
Second, by breaching the supremacy principle courts are refusing to implement 
the decisions of the democratic branches of government.  Because the 
legislature is entitled to have its way, so long as the statute is constitutional, 
judicial refusal “to implement the statutory command is simply lawless . . . [is] 
a minor assault on the constitutional structure itself . . . [and impairs] the basic 
social norm of democratic self government.”181 
This critique seems to have caused Code drafters and commentators little 
worry.  The Comments to original Code section 1-102 explicitly endorse 
counter-textual interpretations of the Code.182  Karl Llewellyn even claimed 
that fealty to the text is a danger.183  He urged broad interpretative license for 
judges and worried about courts “eviscerating” commercial statutes through a 
“wooden and literal reading.”184  These views focus on the need for the UCC to 
evolve along with changes in commercial practices, but they ignore the broader 
institutional concerns that coalesce in the principle of legislative supremacy.  It 
                                                 
 176. Farber, supra note 16, at 291. 
 177. Id. at 292–93. 
 178. Id. at 292. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. (emphasis added). 
 182. U.C.C. § 1-102 (2000).  Some argue that all statutory text is merely “advisory.”  Heidi 
M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945, 990–1028 (1990).  Kent Greenawalt 
responds, commenting that 
[t]he idea that statutes are merely advisory, in the strong sense of not binding courts, 
breaks radically with concepts of liberal democracy and modern traditions of all 
common law countries.  A plausible defense of the position requires a frontal attack on 
those concepts and traditions. 
GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 25. 
 183. See Gedid, supra note 11, at 372–73. 
 184. Id. at 373. 
1100 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:1073 
is as if Code advocates tacitly endorsed what the cynical characterizations of 
the “statutory” nature of the Code have intimated:  that the UCC is not a “true 
Code,”185 that legislators were not interested or able enough to understand the 
rules handed to them by the drafters,186 and that traditional legislation is an 
inadequate methodology for administering uniform commercial laws.187    
But is anyone really willing to ground the avowed methodology for 
interpreting the Code on a fundamental repudiation of its statutory character?  
It is difficult to imagine Karl Llewellyn or anyone else consciously endorsing a 
“lawless” methodology of Code interpretation.188  It is just as difficult to think 
about even the most aggressive counter-textual interpretation of the Code as 
overtly lawless.   
Counter-textual interpretations of Article 2 seem more like errors of focus, a 
kind of cognitive oversight.  The gravitational pull of the common law on 
contract questions is powerful.  It makes the impulse to treat Article 2 as a 
subordinate, extension of common law contract understandable.  A variety of 
commentators acknowledge this kind of inertia in the law, and the 
                                                 
 185. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 11.  White and Summers reference William 
Hawkland’s argument that the UCC deserves greater judicial fidelity than the supremacy 
principle would demand of a simple statute.  Hawkland, supra note 90, at 292 (“There is a wide 
difference between . . . a statute and a true Code.  A ‘code’ is a pre-emptive, systematic, and 
comprehensive enactment of a whole field of law.”).  Hawkland cites Grant Gilmore’s summary 
to elaborate the higher interpretative demands of a Code: 
A “code,” let us say, is a legislative enactment which entirely pre-empts the field and 
which is assumed to carry within it the answers to all possible questions: thus when a 
court comes to a gap or an unforeseen situation, its duty is to find, by extrapolation and 
analogy, a solution consistent with the policy of the codifying law; the pre-Code 
common law is no longer available as an authoritative source. 
Id.  The claim of this Article, that counter-textual interpretations of plainly stated rules cannot be 
sustained as a matter of constitutional principles or practical commercial policy, is modest in 
comparison. 
 186. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 14. 
 187. See id. (discussing how the Comments to the UCC are not given as much weight as 
ordinary legislative history).  Even acknowledging this, says Kent Greenawalt, does not diminish 
the fidelity judges owe to the text. See GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 37.  Another response to 
this is Justice Breyer’s recognition that legislatures have become increasingly bureaucratized, 
with staffers doing most of the close work of statutory drafting and assessment.  Stephen Breyer, 
On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 858 (1992).  
Justice Breyer states that this argues for incorporating the intentions of staffers and drafters into 
the interpretative enterprise under a theory of delegation.  Id.  It does not, however, invalidate the 
legislative process.  Id.  The views of people who are not in government should not have 
independent weight because their role is less formalized than staffers and they have been neither 
elected nor appointed.  See GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 156. 
 188. Some claim that the quest for legislative intent is a “transparent and absurd fiction.”  
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 869–70 (1930). 
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phenomenon is amplified here.189  Analytically it is tedious to keep Code and 
common law variables in their proper realms.  Even the attempt, some will say, 
requires artificial rigidity of thought; a sort of formalistic pigeonholing at odds 
with good decision-making.190 
Even crediting these explanations, the question remains, does the Code 
require that we abandon the principle of legislative supremacy and all of the 
political, institutional, and constitutional concerns it embodies?  Can the Code 
continue to evolve consistent with proper respect for these institutional 
principles?  Fortunately, while the “imperative of the supremacy principle is 
quite strong, its scope is limited”191—“[i]t has decisive impact only when the 
text and statutory history preclude genuine doubt about the statute’s 
meaning.”192 
Under this modest standard, the important interpretative work necessary to 
evolve the Code consistent with changes in commercial practices can continue 
virtually unencumbered.  What it does restrict are overt counter-textual 
interpretations.193  It imposes a straightforward duty to determine whether there 
is genuine doubt about the meaning of the text in the particular context.  This 
fairly includes not just a scan for linguistic mystery but also ambiguity in 
implementation caused by unanticipated facts or new circumstances.194  Some 
will object that this still fails to account for the explicit license in the  
text—viz., original sections 1-102 and 1-103—that arguably invites breach of 
even these minimum boundaries.195  There are two responses to this argument.  
They are presented in subsections a. and b. below. 
                                                 
 189. A number of commentators acknowledge this kind of inertia in the law and the 
phenomenon is amplified here.  GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 16; LLEWELLYN, supra note 2, 
at 66 (“What one has been doing becomes the ‘right’ thing to do.”). 
 190. See GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 16 (noting that the approach is more effective if it 
is gradual). 
 191. Farber, supra note 16, at 293. 
 192. Id. (“[The supremacy principle] has decisive impact only when the text and statutory 
history preclude genuine doubt about the statute’s meaning.”). 
 193. See id. at 297 (arguing that Professor Ronald Dworkin’s advocacy of broad 
interpretative flexibility in the constitutional context fails “to perceive the difference between 
creatively interpreting a statute and rewriting it to suit one’s desires.  This is the distinction that 
the supremacy principle respects”).  Courts that fail to respect legislative supremacy “should be 
criticized for crossing the line between creative interpretation made necessary by statutory 
ambiguity and creative rewriting made possible by the judges’ ‘sly refusal’ to follow a reasonably 
clear statutory command.”  Id. at 302. 
 194. Id. at 302. 
 195. U.C.C. §§ 1-102, 1-103 (2000). 
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a.  The Delegation Doctrine 
So what about the argument that by adopting the Code, the legislature itself 
has granted the license for counter-textual interpretations?196  Superficially, it 
seems far more plausible to draw broad interpretative license from the enacting 
legislature than from some remote drafting committee or its leader.  Indeed, it 
is common for legislatures to pass regulatory statutes, where the expectation is 
that a great deal of law-making will occur after the enabling statute is 
passed.197  One arguably notorious example of this is the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).198 
The implementing regulations of RCRA, the real law, occupy several 
volumes of the CFR, while the enabling legislation is less than fifty pages.199  
The regulations are “mind numbing” in their complexity.200  One assistant 
administrator at the EPA attested that constant changes in the rules have 
resulted in only five people who understand the core regulatory definition on 
which the program is grounded, thereby implying that there is a good chance 
no one in Congress does.201 
If it feels like at some point this should violate some political or 
constitutional principle, the sensation is well grounded.  The nondelegation 
doctrine nominally prevents legislatures from ceding law-making powers to 
other branches or to non-elected decision makers.202  Of course a robust 
nondelegation doctrine would be very hard to square with the realities of the 
modern regulatory state, where there is far more in-depth policy evaluation and 
law-making done by regulatory agencies than by Congress.  Consequently, the 
non-delegation barrier at the federal level is a hollow shell.203  But the state 
bureaucratic engine is far more modest, and the nondelegation doctrine at the 
                                                 
 196. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 14 (noting that some legislatures never 
looked at the comments from which the broadest license is drawn). 
 197. Rubin, supra note 4, at 381–82. 
 198. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et. seq. (2006)). 
 199. See About RCRA, Resources Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/lrca.html (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 
 200. Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing the 
court’s journey through the legislative intent of RCRA). 
 201. United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 882 (E.D. Wash. 1991). 
 202. Rubin, supra note 4, at 387 (“The delegation constraint, which is derived from the 
separation of powers between the governmental branches, is designed to limit the transfer of the 
legislature’s power to another branch . . . [and] functions as both a legal doctrine and a political 
norm.”). 
 203. Id. at 388–89.  Nondelegation “has not been used to strike down any federal statute 
recently, and there seems little chance it will be, despite occasional rumblings from the Supreme 
Court.”  Id.; see also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 479–80 (1989) (characterizing the doctrine as “an 
empty exercise in judicial rhetoric”). 
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state level continues as a strong affirmation that the legislative prerogative is 
not something representatives can give away.204  It is an institutional principle 
confirming that the power to legislate is not owned by the legislature, but is a 
structural support of constitutional democracies.205      
The explanation for the decline of the federal delegation doctrine 
underscores its importance in the context of state commercial codes.  Edward 
Rubin argues that it just recognizes the reality of the modern administrative 
state, where legislatures are not equipped to do more than set general goals and 
guidelines.206  The argument that delegation is an abdication of legislative 
responsibility to decision-makers who are insulated from voters, he argues, is 
only persuasive where the implementation mechanism is courts rather than 
agencies.207  He claims the nondelegation argument is erroneous when applied 
to agencies.208 
The difficulty with this argument is that it engrafts premodern 
notions of control and accountability onto the realities of modern 
government.  With regard to control, it assumes that articulated rules 
are the best, and indeed the only, method by which a legislature can 
control an implementation mechanism.  That assumption is probably 
true for courts, and it is thus a general principle if courts are the only 
implementation mechanism available.209 
Broad delegation to agencies is legitimate because legislatures have many 
legitimate ways of communicating details to agencies, says Rubin.210  
Overbroad delegation is really only a problem where the implementation 
mechanism is courts.211  
Interpretation of the Code falls easily into the exception that Rubin credits.  
Indeed, the Code case is worse for several reasons. First, the delegation of 
power comes by implication.212   It is not at all clear that legislatures make an 
                                                 
 204. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Horse Racing Comm’n, 422 A.2d 487, 489 (Pa. 1980) (resisting the 
erosion of constraints against the delegation of law-making power at the state level), remanded to 
432 A.2d 275 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981). 
 205. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (declaring that the “constitutional 
authority of [one branch of government] cannot be expanded by the ‘consent’ of the 
governmental unit whose domain is narrowed”). 
 206. Rubin, supra note 4, at 399–400 (“No legislature could possibly have time to enact more 
than a fraction of the statutes that it favored if it were required to draft the rules that were 
ultimately to be applied.”). 
 207. Id. at 388–90. 
 208. Id. at 393–94. 
 209. Id. at 393.  When the implementation mechanism is an agency, Rubin contends that 
other legislative measures of control can be more effective.  Id. 
 210. Id. at 381–82. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See Gedid, supra note 11, at 341 (discussing how the Code has failed to produce 
uniformity and created conflicting case law). 
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informed decision inviting courts to supplant the statutory text.213   The broader 
interpretative license comes from the comments, which no state has 
codified,214 and many enacting legislatures.215  Furthermore, there is little 
evidence that the UCC drafters were thinking seriously about the broader state 
constitutional issues that overbroad delegation entails, and the drafters 
certainly had no authority to authorize delegation of legislative power or 
constitutional change.216  So there is a strong substantive rebuttal to the 
argument that the legislature has explicitly licensed counter-textual 
interpretations.  As the next section shows, there also are strong practical ones. 
b.  The Dubious License of the Official Comments 
Attention to the questions of political structure and constitutionality yield a 
very different set of interpretative priorities from those advanced by Code 
drafters and commentators.  Jabez G. Sutherland’s classic treatment of 
statutory interpretation, without specific reference to the Code, takes an 
entirely opposite view from the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the American Law Institute (ALI), and most 
judges about the weight to be accorded “Official Comments” that invite 
counter-textual interpretations.217  Comments to 1-102 plausibly endorse “not 
x” interpretations of the textual command “x.”218  Sutherland, on the other 
hand, admonishes that courts must ignore comments to uniform laws that 
endorse outcomes inconsistent with what the legislature actually said.219  
The error of the comments and of judges who embrace them unreflectively 
is one of incomplete perspective—a focus on the Code’s resolution of 
commercial law problems without consideration for the institutional principles 
that constrain statutory interpretation.220  William Hawkland describes the 
problem and explains it as an unwillingness of judges to live within the options 
provided by the text:221 
                                                 
 213. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text (explaining how courts have directly 
gone against the language of the Code and this conflicts with their role in interpreting Article 2). 
 214. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 2. 
 215. Id. § 5 at 14. 
 216. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 217. Most courts follow the Comments.  See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 14 
(noting that there are a few “exceptional” cases where courts do not follow the Comments). 
 218. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 99, § 52:5. 
 219. Id. § 52:5, at 378 (“The commentary to a model statute is not entitled to much weight 
where the model is at odds with the legislative scheme actually adopted.” (citing Friant v. Friant, 
553 A.2d 1186 (Del. 1989))). 
 220. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text (questioning whether judges ignoring the 
Code is justifiable under any principle of statutory interpretation). 
 221. Hawkland, supra note 90, at 304–05. 
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It has been observed that courts, torn between the duties of staying 
within the law or getting a just result, frequently accommodate the 
latter by manipulating the former . . . .  Decisions arrived at through 
the semi-covert techniques of manipulation and adverse construction 
may result in justice for the immediate parties, but they leave in their 
wake a twisted law . . . .222 
Hawkland argues that within the text of the Code are broad areas of discretion 
that permit judges the flexibility to do justice, and to recognize changes or 
peculiarities in custom and practice.223  Counter-textual interpretations 
(“adverse construction” in his terminology) “leave in their wake a twisted 
law.”224  This bolsters Sutherland’s counsel against following comments that 
contravene the text and emphasizes the need to reconcile the institutional 
principles of statutory interpretation with the goals of uniform laws.225  That 
reconciliation, he shows, requires judges to respect and enforce the plain 
language of the text.226   
Lon Fuller’s classic treatment makes the point more philosophically, 
advancing criteria he says are essential to the internal morality of law.227  They 
are drawn from a set of shared cultural beliefs and expectations.228  He 
contends that legislation violating this morality would not be law.229  Included 
in this list are the requirements of clarity, which insist that citizens not be 
subjected to rules they cannot understand nor to the uncontrolled, arbitrary 
power of the implementation mechanism.230   
Even more apt is Fuller’s principle of congruence, requiring that the law be 
administered so that its application bears a reasonable resemblance to its stated 
form.231  Counter-textual interpretations are plain and open breaches of these 
principles.232  Rubin argues that Fuller’s principles “derive from the single 
                                                 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 305.  Examples cited are sections 1–203, 1–204, 2–103, 2–302, 2–716(1),  
3–511(1), 4–103(2), 8–406, and 9–207.  Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 99, § 56A:11, at 700 (stating that courts had interpretative 
control over the context of statutes, but are now “out of the loop”). 
 227. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–94 (rev. ed. 1978).  Rubin contends that most 
people accept Fuller’s norm.  Rubin, supra note 4, at 404. 
 228. See FULLER, supra note 227, at 33–69 (discussing eight types of legal excellence 
derived from a general relationship with people). 
 229. Id. at 39.  Rubin restates Fuller’s theory by writing that Fuller’s principles “apply to 
every situation in which the state governs human conduct . . . situations in which state power is 
brought to bear on private persons.”  Rubin, supra note 4, at 403. 
 230. FULLER, supra note 227, at 63–65. 
 231. Id. at 81–82. 
 232. See id. at 63–64 (noting that revisions of legislation by unauthorized entities, while 
perhaps clarifying the text’s obscure language, impair legality). 
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underlying norm that people should understand the legal rules that they are 
expected to obey.”233  And while Rubin ultimately criticizes Fuller’s principles 
as insufficient to invalidate administrative rulemaking, even Rubin concedes 
that where the statutory implementation mechanism is courts, rather than 
agencies, Fuller’s principles capture essential requirements of legitimacy.234  
As such, there are strong institutional, practical, and philosophical reasons for 
demanding a minimum level of fidelity to the text of the Code, and particularly 
Article 2, as the next section shows.    
2.  Article 2 Trading Rules in the Information Age 
It is not a new argument that the Internet changes the way we should think 
about and administer Article 2.235  More than a decade ago, the Chair of the 
ABA Task Force on the revision of Article 2 argued that some of the problems 
that have burdened proposed revisions to Article 2 would be resolved or 
largely mooted by the Internet.236  Also, it is nothing new for Article 2 to 
recognize the distinction between the way frequent, sophisticated traders 
(merchants) and sporadic, unsophisticated traders (non–merchants) engage the 
statutory guidance.237  Similarly, it is fair to expect that uncounseled, less 
sophisticated traders (merchants or not) will interact with the rules differently 
than large enterprises with in-house legal staffs or counsel on retainer.238   
Professor Kent Greenawalt argues that statutory interpretation should take 
into account the kind of accessibility that the “main addressees of statutes 
[have to information], given the time and expense one could reasonably expect 
them to undertake: One could expect more extensive legal research if the main 
addressees were large corporations than if they were ordinary, private 
people.”239  For perhaps the bulk of traders, fidelity to plain meaning of the 
basic rules of Article 2 is important to an open and transparent system of 
                                                 
 233. Rubin, supra note 4, at 404. 
 234. Id. at 402–03. 
 235. See Daniel K. Wiig, U.C.C. Article 2 Warranties and Internet-Based Transactions: Do 
the Article 2 Warranties Sufficiently Protect Internet-Based Transactions with Unprofessional 
Internet Merchants?, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 717, 717–19 (2007) (discussing how the 
Internet has revolutionized faceless transactions). 
 236. See Thomas J. McCarthy, An Introduction: The Commercial Irrelevancy of the “Battle 
of the Forms,” 49 BUS. LAW. 1019, 1025 (1994) (arguing that an increasing number of electronic 
transactions occur without the inclusion of boilerplate found in paper transactions). 
 237. See Michael M. Greenfield, Symposium, Consumer Protection and the Uniform 
Commercial Code: The Role of Assent in Article 2 and Article 9, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 289, 290–92 
(1997) (discussing thirteen places in Article 2 that create special rules for merchants that differ 
from those that apply to non-merchants). 
 238. See id. at 291 n.11 (discussing how non-merchants rarely exchange standard-form 
documents). 
 239. GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 178 n.213 (citing REED DICKERSON, THE 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 150–51 (1975)). 
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administration—essential to democratizing access to the commercial rules of 
the road.  Counter-textual interpretations of core instructions, shrouded in the 
fog of the common law process and unlocked only by payments to the lawyer’s 
guild, are exclusionary and anti-democratic.   
The world has changed since the UCC was conceived.  Before the Internet, 
just locating information was an arduous task.  Reliable and efficient sources 
of nominally “public” information fetched premium value.240  Push button 
access to the work of legislatures or agencies was science fiction.  Today it is 
prosaic.  Most any motivated businessperson (indeed most any literate citizen) 
can access the regulations and statutes that govern his or her industry as well as 
business transactions with a few clicks of a mouse.241  This raises an important 
question about the assumptions we want them to bring to that search.   
Some rules are straightforward and operate essentially like traffic signs.  
Common law style counter-textual interpretations of such rules disappoint 
reasonable expectations and upset the incentives in the legislation.  A regime 
where one has to buy the knowledge of specialists to determine when rules that 
say “off” really mean “on,” profoundly disadvantages unsophisticated, casual 
traders and introduces both uncertainty and unwarranted opportunities for 
gaming.   
One answer is that people should always consult lawyers.  But this often is 
not practical or cost-effective.  How realistic is it to believe that most people 
affected by these rules will have effective access to a lawyer familiar with the 
Code’s counter-textual traps?  How much time should they spend to seek out a 
lawyer?  Will they be able to access someone whose bill will reflect the 
efficient rendering of the advice they need?  Or will they pay for the 
generalist’s self-education about the places where “off” really means “on?”  
Even if they find the right lawyer will he or she even deign to sell them the 
small slice of advice they actually need?  Counter-textual interpretations 
impose these burdens on questions that might otherwise be answered by a few 
mouse clicks and a plain English sentence.   
The possibility of blatant counter-textual interpretations may not even occur 
to some people and they will end up burned by an “off” button that really 
means “on.”  Now their incentive is to overconsume the services of lawyers on 
the fear that these snares are everywhere.  Perhaps this is good for lawyers, but 
                                                 
 240. James T. O’Reilly, “Access to Records” Versus “Access to Evil:” Should Disclosure 
Laws Consider Motives as a Barrier to Records Release, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 559 
(2003).  Documents and materials are available today with a few mouse clicks.  See, e.g., Laws & 
Regulations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs (last visited Jun. 19, 
2012). 
 241. An Internet search for Article 2 of the Code generates, among other things, the website 
for Cornell University Law School, which provides Article 2’s text.  Uniform Commercial  
Code - Article 2 Sales, LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/2/overview.html (last visited Jun. 19, 2012). 
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it is bad for contracting.  It layers trades with costs that might be avoided if 
plain meaning were respected and if statutory provisions could be read and 
followed by traders with confidence that the lawyer’s guild had not secretly 
turned night into day.  It is fair that traders should be charged with seeking 
counsel where the rules are complex or ambiguous.  But where the public rule 
says up, and the actual rule administered by a guild of legal insiders says 
down, the public is ill served. 
3.  Democratizing the Commercial Rules of the Road 
Lon Fuller argued that “the inner morality of law” requires rules that are 
comprehensible to the regulated community,242 stating: “A statute whose 
meaning can only be determined by reference to unpublished, unreported or 
unstated legislative preferences does not qualify as binding and effective 
legislation.”243  Fuller’s point is normative—an argument about legitimacy and 
accessibility.244  It highlights the strong policy reasons for avoiding  
counter-textual adjustments to plain statutory language.245  True, the common 
law is “public” information,246 but comparatively speaking, the common law is 
a mystery, and drawing the law from cases is a specialized skill.247  
Professor Colin Diver extends Fuller’s argument: because private parties 
“have no authoritative interpretative power, [over the statutes that govern 
them], their legitimate expectations must be protected from the agencies and 
courts possessing such power.”248  Judges might be tempted to dismiss these as 
merely theoretical, academic criticisms.  But Justice Felix Frankfurter made 
the same basic point more than half a century ago: “If a statute is written for 
ordinary folk, it would be arbitrary not to assume that Congress intended its 
                                                 
 242. FULLER, supra note 227, at 42–43. 
 243. Id. at 49–51. 
 244. Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administration State, 133 U. PA. L. REV 
549, 576–77 (1985). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Cheryl M. Scheinkopf, Balancing Free Speech, Privacy, and Open Government: Why 
Government Should Not Restrict the Truthful Reporting of Public Record Information, 49 UCLA 
L. REV. 1567, 1586 (1997). 
 247. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 2, at 37–54 (describing how to interpret and analyze case 
opinions); see also Hawkland, supra note 90, at 296 (“When the number of printed cases becomes 
like the number of grains of sand on the beach, a precedent-based case-law system does not work 
and cannot be made to work.  A hundred years ago, a lawyer in the course of his professional 
career, could . . . become familiar with the entire body of case law . . . .  In this country it has 
been a long time since even the best lawyer could make that claim, even in the narrowest field.  
But the effect of the multiplication of cases to infinity is not merely an accretion of intellectual 
anxiety among lawyers.  This phenomenon strikes at the roots of the case-law system.” (citing 
Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1041 (1961))). 
 248. See Diver, supra note 244, at 577. 
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words to be read with the minds of ordinary men.”249  So while it may be true 
that some parts of the Code are “technical lawyer’s law,” many of the 
provisions of Article 2 are basic commercial traffic signals.250  Counter-textual 
interpretations transform them from plain rules of the road into snares.  
Permitting citizens to rely on the plain meaning of public law has important 
practical consequences in the trading context.  Ordinary people are likely to 
encounter the law in one of three contexts: criminal law, torts, or contracts.  In 
the first two contexts they are essentially spectators.  If they are victims or 
charged with a crime, the state calls the tune, citizens are responsive, and their 
rights are protected to one degree or another by counsel.251  Where they are 
victims of a tort or insured tortfeasors, lawyers financed by insurance coverage 
or on a contingency fee will administer the conflict.  But an ordinary person 
with a medium to low value contracts conflict generally is on his or her own.  
If the stakes are unusually high, he or she might hire a lawyer and pay the fees 
out of pocket.  But for countless trades and trading disputes, any strategic 
planning done or justice obtained will be extracted without much assistance 
from counsel.  People proceeding this way can fairly access and decipher many 
statutory provisions.252  Therefore, it is especially poor public policy to 
surprise someone who finds a straightforward statutory rule governing his or 
her problem with a counter-textual interpretation reflecting some judge’s view 
of “better” policy.253 
For the uninitiated or uncounseled, just locating counter-textual 
interpretations is difficult.  They are not laid out like statutes and do not have a 
singular coherent form.254  Karl Llewellyn counseled young lawyers that 
common law rules were inadequate predictors of outcome (and therefore 
planning) because they were formulated so broadly.255  So even where citizens 
                                                 
 249. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 
536 (1947); see also Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. 
REV. 417, 417–18 (1898-1899) (“[Judges] ask, not what this man meant, but what those words 
would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in 
which they are used.”). 
 250. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 251. See Criminal Procedure, LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/Criminal_Procedure (last visited Jun. 19, 2012) (explaining the 
basic stages and cornerstones of American criminal procedure). 
 252. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 253. See John F. Manning, Statutory Pragmatism and Constitutional Structures, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 1161, 1163–70 (2007) (discussing the costs and benefits of the judiciary’s use of  
counter-textual arguments). 
 254. See generally Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin”: Formalism in Law and 
Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530 (1999) (describing the challenge between following the letter of 
the text or the moral intent behind the law). 
 255. Karl N. Llewellyn, Thorough Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
159, 160–61 (1938). 
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can find the “right” cases, drawing the “law” from them requires a lawyer’s 
training.256   
Kent Greenawalt argues that the easy availability of statutory commands is 
one of the central normative reasons for fidelity to statutory text.257  Statutes 
make basic legal rules accessible to people who are not trained to decipher the 
common law.  This is especially important in the context of trading rules, 
because so many traders will proceed uncounseled both before and after their 
deals become conflicts.258    
A similar concern motivated advocacy for the Code in the first place.  Karl 
Llewellyn argued that one reason for replacing the “Uniform Acts” with the 
UCC was because “the Uniform Acts were so complex that they were useless 
except to specialized lawyers.”259  Under the Code, Llewellyn argued “the law 
of commerce and commercial finance becomes relatively quick to find, to 
understand and to use.”260  While Llewellyn may not have anticipated the 
democratization of information wrought by the Internet, his advice counsels 
demystification of trading rules and that requires respect for plain statutory 
commands.261   
Llewellyn also issued a warning.  The failure of the law to account for the 
realities of commercial trading would make it irrelevant—people would ignore 
it and refuse to use it in planning.262  While Llewellyn advanced this view in 
pursuit of greater incorporation of trade usage into commercial law, it is more 
broadly an argument about democratization.263  For small, uncounseled traders, 
the point is stronger.  Counter-textual interpretations that muddy the waters 
                                                 
 256. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 2 at 37–54. 
 257. See GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 37 (“Statutory terms are what is most easily 
available to members of the public and to those who advise them.  Citizens should have some 
idea what they are expected to do.  For ordinary statutory law, the words of statutes are their best 
guide.”). 
 258. The reason is that legal counsel in many cases simply are not cost effective.  Often, 
people will pursue the matter themselves by submitting a complaint to the Better Business Bureau 
or pursuing the action in a small claims court.  Making law accessible in this context is 
particularly important.  For common rules of the commercial road—text that is relatively easy to 
understand—it is perverse to encumber them with “common law style” counter-textual 
interpretations that are inaccessible to the uncounseled. 
 259. Gedid, supra note 11, at 358. 
 260. TWINING, supra note 165, at 537. 
 261. Id. (“Yet the great fact of policy remains: if American enterprise is to develop as a free 
economy, then the rule of the game must therefore be made readily knowable.  They must be 
simple . . . and also as easy to know as the best legal engineering can make them.”). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
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around relatively plain statutory commands create the same problem that the 
Code attempted to alleviate.264   
Pre-Code commercial law decisions were “fascinating and diverse.  They 
were also disastrous to the commercial community, for in spite of the fact that 
this process developed some novel principles of great value[,] . . . it also 
produced a state of flux making impossible the realization of one of the highest 
commercial law ideals, that of predictability.”265  Counter-textual 
interpretations of the Code pose the same problem. Creative departures from 
the text may indeed float new, useful principles and do better justice between 
litigants.  But systemically, they impair predictability and create snares for the 
uncounseled.266 
Some will object that this Article overestimates how much people truly do or 
will access and engage the Code; that most people, perhaps even most 
legislators, do not read most statutes.267  This allows the argument that 
statutory interpretation should not credit the understanding of ordinary people, 
and courts should “forget about the understanding of language by anyone less 
expert than a lawyer likely to be consulted about a problem.”268  Kent 
Greenawalt offers a nice theoretical response to this objection.  It focuses on 
principles of access and criticism of assumptions about the special 
vocabularies and capabilities of lawyers and legislatures.269  Ultimately it 
distills into the normative claim that “judges should concentrate on the 
understanding of members of the most relevant community.”270  Under Article 
2, that is the broad community of traders—most of them proceeding 
uncounseled, or undercounseled, without intention or capacity to engage the 
Code as a common-law-centric, litigation-focused rulebook.271 
Greenawalt’s argument is compelling, but another response is simple irony.  
It is profoundly ironic to suggest 1) that citizens are charged with knowledge 
of public laws, 2) that access to them will be widely available, 3) that many 
basic Code rules will be stated in terms most traders can understand, and then 
on the last turn, 4) that the statutory meaning will be flipped through a process 
that only lawyers can access or understand. 
                                                 
 264. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.  See generally Richard A. Posner, Legal 
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 179 (1986-87). 
 265. See Hawkland, supra note 90, at 293. 
 266. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
 267. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 14. 
 268. See GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 79–80. 
 269. Id. at 80–81. 
 270. Id. at 82. 
 271. See id. at 35–37 (noting that judges realize that individuals subject to a law should be 
reasonably sure what the statute means and that they expect it to be enforced accordingly). 
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III.  THE ROUGH CARPENTRY OF ARTICLE 2: RECONCILIATION AND ANALYSIS 
This Article has argued so far that the impulses fueling liberal construction 
of the Code cannot entirely trump the competing institutional principles and 
public policy that counsel fidelity to the text.   Section A of this Part 
summarizes and distills those conflicting inputs into some basic principles of 
reconciliation.  Section B applies those principles to a closer analysis of the 
counter-textual interpretations summarized in Section A. 
No doubt the drafters of the UCC aimed to grant judges broad interpretative 
license.272  It is equally clear that the UCC, as statute, demands fidelity to 
unambiguous textual commands.273  We must credit both things and recognize 
that they are in conflict.  Reconciliation requires, at a minimum, that courts 
enforce plain textual commands about which there is no genuine doubt.274  
This is a two-part filter because genuine doubt naturally breaks down into 
linguistic doubt (textual puzzles), and circumstantial doubt (puzzles created by 
new types of problems).275   
Application of these basic principles is aided by the policy claim that parts 
of Article 2 are plain commercial traffic signals for which democratization and 
uniformity compel fidelity to the text.276  This reinforces the principle of 
legislative supremacy and, in close cases, may tip the balance toward textual 
fidelity. 
For an illustration of these principles at work, consider the contentious 
policy questions that stalled adoption of Revised Article 2.  One of those 
questions was the treatment of the shrinkwrap question summarized in Part 
I.277  Imagine now that a state resolves this question in favour of consumers, 
with the text and legislative history making this plain.  It would be a high-order 
violation of duty for a court to reverse that policy decision.278  
Not every breach of fidelity will be as plain.  Consider the case where a 
legislature is given explicit policy choices by Code drafters and selects one.  
Judicial defiance of that choice would be a high-order breach of fidelity, but 
perhaps less so than in the shrinkwrap case, especially if the legislative choice 
was a perfunctory selection and many decades old.279 
                                                 
 272. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 17–20. 
 273. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text. 
 275. See supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra notes 249–50, 257 and accompanying text. 
 277. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 7; see also supra Part I (discussing the 
shrinkwrap cases). 
 278. It is interesting to consider how much time should elapse before one can make a 
plausible argument that the obligation to evolve the Code in accordance with changes in 
commercial circumstances permits the repudiation of a “failed” legislative policy choice. 
 279. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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Contrast these two cases with the many places where the Code quite openly 
requires judges to operate in essentially common law mode to develop  
“open-ended” provisions of the UCC.280  The principles distilled here still 
respect the broad license arguably anticipated by the Code and commentators, 
fully crediting, for example, White and Summers counsel that terms like 
“commercial reasonableness” and “good faith” demand interpretative 
creativity,281 the many places where the text employs undefined terms that 
must be understood by reference to the common law,282 and the sections where 
the text itself is a puzzle whose solution requires invocation of common law 
principles.283 
Sections A through H below will evaluate, within this framework, the 
counter-textual interpretations that were summarized in Part I.  Unlike Part I, 
where they were ordered sequentially, this Part will treat the counter-textual 
interpretations in rough order of their infidelity to the text, starting with the 
interpretations that are most difficult to sustain within the boundaries of 
genuine linguistic or circumstantial doubt.  
A.  Section 2-306: Requirements Contracts 
Although the text of section 2-306 makes no such distinction, a substantial 
constellation of cases treat drastic reductions from estimated or normal 
requirements or output entirely differently from drastic increases.284  
Prominent commentators take the same view.285  As a matter of policy, the 
cases are easy to understand.  Disproportionate increases are practically and 
conceptually a far more serious problem than disproportionate decreases.  
Generally speaking, the limitation on disproportionate puts or takes 
anticipates the attempt by requirements buyers or output sellers to exploit 
                                                 
 280. Compare U.C.C. § 2-102 (2011), and id. § 1-103, with Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 
F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997), and ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 
1996). 
 281. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 9.  White and Summers counsel that terms 
like “commercial reasonableness” and “good faith” demand interpretative creativity.  Id. 
 282. Id. § 3, at 7–8 (noting the section 2-403 provision on purchaser’s title to goods, which 
“turns on the distinction between void and voidable title, a distinction that requires courts to 
invoke non-Code law”). 
 283. Id. 
 284. See, e.g., MDC Corp. v. John H. Harland Co., 228 F. Supp. 2d 387, 395–96 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (finding that most authorities have held that the buyer may reduce requirements to zero as 
long as he or she does so in good faith).  But see Simcala Inc. v. Am. Coal Trade, Inc., 821 So. 2d 
197, 202 (Ala. 2001) (holding that principles of statutory interpretation require that decreases are 
not disproportionate to any estimate under the plain meaning of section 2-306(1)). 
 285. See KNAPP ET AL., supra note 24, at 464; see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 
141–42. 
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changes in market price.286  Where a buyer has contracted for his requirements 
at 1 and the market price goes to 2, he has an incentive to “require” an 
indefinite quantity that he can resell at an easy profit.287  Similarly, where the 
market price declines, the output seller has an incentive to indefinitely increase 
his “output” by purchasing product in the market for 1 and selling at the 
contract price of 2. 
However, where the requirements or the output of these traders declines, 
even to zero, the problem is less severe because the potential for abuse is 
finite.288  The extent of abuse is precisely predictable going in and 
comparatively moderate.    Exploitation is limited by the hard floor of zero puts 
or takes.289  There is no similar practical cap on the exploitation through 
disproportionate increases.290  Additionally, the disproportionate decrease is 
more easily policed through the claim of basic breach of contract.  A trader 
who hopes to exploit market shifts by reducing her puts or takes must abandon 
her contract obligations in favor of a more profitable shadow trade in the open 
market—viz., she must reduce her puts or takes and then replace those trades 
with new transactions with other traders—a plainly evident, direct breach of 
agreement.291  
The shadow trade in the increase case (demanding more than is truly 
required and reselling or “producing” through market purchases more than is 
truly made and dumping the output on the buyer) is less evidently a breach of 
                                                 
 286. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 140–44; see also Stacey A. Silkworth, Quantity 
Variation in Open Quantity Contracts, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 235, 265–66 (1990). 
 287. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 140–41. 
 288. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts: 
Reining in Good Faith, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 319, 347 (2002) (noting that a requirements buyer 
can only cut its requirements to zero, whereas it could increase purchases without limit absent a 
contractual restriction). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id.  Judge Posner also suggests that the bar on disproportionate increases is consistent 
with the likely intent of the drafters of a contract.  Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 
F.2d 1333, 1337 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that “[i]f there were no ceiling . . . [the buyer] might 
increase his ‘requirements’ so that he could resell the good at a profit . . . .  This would place him 
in competition with the seller—a result the parties would not have [bargained for].”); accord N. 
Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Colo. Westmoreland, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 613, 636 (N.D. Ind. 1987), aff’d, 
845 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 291. The court will rule for the seller if it finds that the buyer decreased its requirements in 
bad faith.  See, e.g., Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d at 1341 (finding that the buyer acted in bad faith 
by repudiating without providing a reason); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 28, at  
141–42.  However, “[c]ourts place the risk of good faith variation in buyer’s requirements on 
seller,” and rarely rule against buyers who decrease their requirements.  Comment, And Then 
There Were None: Requirements Contracts and the Buyer Who Does Not Buy, 64 WASH. L. REV. 
871, 875–76 (1989). 
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the contract.292  While the parties might explicitly contract that the 
requirements buyer may not resell (to anyone, or only to subsidiaries, or only 
under conditions of exigency), the understandable reluctance of buyers to bind 
themselves in this fashion helps illustrate why such terms will not be uniform 
and correspondingly why the 2-306 default filter exists.293  Similarly, an output 
seller would be reluctant to make a promise not to buy the product, or parts of 
it or constituent materials in the open market, particularly where the product 
(1) consists of materials and components that may be purchased in various 
stages of refinement or assembly or (2) is evolving in specifications or 
capabilities that might require various levels of outsourcing.294  Even where 
traders negotiated to permit specified limited reaches into the market, that 
freedom itself will likely be enough to enable some level of abuse.  So again, 
the disproportionate increase presents a tougher problem, one where the need 
for the 2-306 filter is clearer.295   
These differences help explain why courts have permitted good faith 
reductions to zero, even though that repudiates the statutory command of  
2-306.296  Under a purely common law regime, this is a laudable adjustment 
and improvement, but as statutory interpretation, it is highly problematic.   
The difficulty is that the issue is so straightforward that it cannot be 
classified as something new that requires courts to adjust or grow the Code.  
The distinction between disproportionate increases and decreases is quite 
evident as a matter of practice and theory.297  So much so that the plainly stated 
symmetrical treatment of reductions and increases in section 2-306 must be 
viewed as an explicit policy choice.298  Perhaps it is an inferior policy choice, 
but that choice is privileged by the statutory nature of the Code.299   
                                                 
 292. In order to win relief, the seller in an increase case must prove that the buyer did not 
increase his demand for a legitimate business purpose.  See, e.g., Silkworth, supra note 286, at 
273–74. 
 293. Shelly Smith, A New Approach to the Identification and Enforcement of Open Quantity 
Contracts: Reforming the Law of Exclusivity and Good Faith, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 871, 893 
(1990). 
 294. See Silkworth, supra note 286, at 339–40. 
 295. Exploitation of the requirement/output contract might also constitute a violation of the 
general obligation of good faith and, in this sense, is technically a direct breach of the agreement.  
This is a fair technical point, but practically speaking, it is plain that the claim of explicit breach 
of dickered terms is far easier to sustain than a claim grounded on the amorphous concept of good 
faith.  See Nicholas J. Johnson, The Boundaries of Extracompensatory Relief for Abusive Breach 
of Contract, 33 CONN. L. REV. 181, 191–93 (2000) (discussing the difficulty of infusing 
substance into the concept of good faith). 
 296. See supra notes 288–92 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra notes 290–91 and accompanying text. 
 298. See Silkworth, supra note 286, at 238–40. 
 299. A minority of courts have indeed adopted this statutory plain meaning approach.  See, 
e.g., Simcala, Inc. v. Am. Coal Trade, Inc., 821 So. 2d 197, 202 (Ala. 2001). 
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B.  Section 2-609: Adequate Assurances 
Section 2-609 allows a promisee who has reasonable grounds for insecurity 
about the promisor’s performance to seek adequate assurances of performance 
by making a written demand.  Nonetheless, there is a significant strand of case 
law that dispenses with the writing requirement.300  Part of this may be 
explained by common law inertia.  In contrast to the Code, the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts says that the demand for adequate assurances may be 
oral.301  Grounded perhaps in this thinking, many courts have excused the 
writing requirement of 2-609. 
There is a weak argument that the text is ambiguous here.  The text does say 
the promisee “may in writing demand.”302  So one can imagine an argument 
that you may demand in writing or implicitly you may demand orally.  
However, fairly read, this merely shows that the opportunity to demand 
adequate assurances is an option that the promisee may exercise.  The 
subsequent clause, “may if commercially reasonable suspend performance,” 
operates the same way.303  The word “may” connotes the option to suspend 
performance and to request adequate assurances.  It does not make optional the 
requirements for exercising those opportunities.  It does not, for example, 
eliminate the requirement that the suspension be commercially reasonable,  nor 
does it eliminate the requirement that the request for assurances be in writing.  
Moreover, the cases excusing the writing requirement generally have not 
been grounded on a claim of textual ambiguity.  The candid explanation for 
enforcing oral requests for adequate assurances is to avoid injustice to the party 
seeking assurances.304  This underscores the broader point that common law 
methodology permeates Code interpretation.  Courts have employed the 
common law toolkit to achieve an arguably laudable result, but it is a blatant 
repudiation of legislative supremacy.  The text is plain and circumstances are 
no different from what was anticipated by the text.305  If we believe that the 
common law should trump the text in order to do justice here, there is no 
reason to limit that approach to just this section. 
                                                 
 300. The rationale for abandoning the writing requirement is to do justice between the 
parties. Smyers v. Quartz Prods. Works Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1425, 1433 (D. Kan. 1995) 
(construing a request for payment on a previous shipment as a request for assurance to avoid 
injustice).  Professor White details circumstances where justice concerns would dictate different 
interpretations of the right to adequate assurances.  See James J. White, Eight Cases and Section 
251, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 857–59 (1982) (showing how courts use adequate assurances to 
achieve substantial justice where the order of material breach is in question). 
 301. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 cmt. d (1981) (“The demand need not 
be in writing.”). 
 302. U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (2011). 
 303. Id. 
 304. See, e.g., Smyers, 880 F. Supp. at 1433 (explaining how a request for payment of a prior 
shipment of goods can be construed as a written request for assurances to avoid injustice). 
 305. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-609; Smyers, 880 F. Supp. at 1433. 
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C.  Section 2-202: Parol Evidence Rule 
Section 2-202 adopts a hierarchy of evidence that informs the meaning of a 
fully integrated written agreement under the Parol Evidence Rule.306  Through 
a cross-reference to section 1-205, the text makes clear that in the case of 
conflict express terms trump course of dealing and usage of trade.307  Judicial 
renovations to this section are classically counter-textual.  Courts have openly 
rejected the hierarchy of evidence established in the text.308  The open 
justification is that in some cases the textual hierarchy renders inferior 
results.309  There is an active literature urging the counter-textual view of 
section 2-202.  Professor Roger Kirst argues that even express contractual 
language that confirms what the Code already has said—i.e., express terms 
superseding any trade usage or of course of dealing—should not be conclusive 
if deemed boilerplate.310   
One response to the charge of textual infidelity here is that the policy choice 
is unusual.  It is plausible to say that 2-202 is less substantive law and more 
judicial housekeeping that involves another realm of decision-making311—that 
the rough handling of 2-202 is explained by judicial ambivalence about the 
utility of the Parol Evidence Rule.312  On the other hand, section 2-202 quite 
explicitly implicates the planning, negotiating, and drafting decisions of 
ordinary traders.313  So it is not purely about administering litigation,314 but it is 
                                                 
 306. U.C.C. § 2-202. 
 307. Id. § 1-205. 
 308. See Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1314–16 (S.D. Fla. 
1999) (holding that a merger clause does not negate course of dealing or trade usage); see also A 
& A Mech., Inc. v. Therma Equip. Sales Inc., 998 S.W.2d 505, 510–11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) 
(holding that trade usage and course of dealing can be considered despite the existence of a 
contrary merger clause). 
 309. See A & A Mech., 998 S.W.2d at 510–11. 
 310. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 24, at 430 (stating that this would put form over party intent 
(citing Kirst, supra note 27, at 863–68)); see also Kastely, supra note 27, at 866–68. 
 311. Is judicial housekeeping experience sufficient change to justify invoking the license of 
Article 1?  Is it this type of change and experience that the Code has in mind in Article 1?  Or is 
that license instead dependent on observed changes in the commercial world?  The restrictive 
view is that such evidence is inadmissible if it appears to contradict the terms of the written 
agreement.  See supra note 27 (citing cases that exemplify both the restrictive and counter-textual 
view). 
 312. See Zell v. Am. Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 644 (2d Cir. 1943) (finding the Parol 
Evidence Rule is not “so beneficent, so promotive of the administration of justice, and so 
necessary to business stability, that it should be given the widest possible application.”), rev’d, 
322 U.S. 709 (1944); see also Susan J. Martin-Davidson, Yes, Judge Kozinski, There Is a Parol 
Evidence Rule in California—The Lessons of a Pyrrihic Victory, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (1995). 
 313. U.C.C. § 2-202 (2011). 
 314. As a general matter, the Parol Evidence Rule is considered substantive law.  Federal 
courts, obliged to follow state substantive law by federal procedural law, are therefore bound to 
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substantially about the kind of steps necessary to minimize the risk of 
litigation.315 
Moreover, even if the rule is considered just a housekeeping item about 
which judges should have the best information, the Code makes an explicit 
judgment about the importance of express terms versus course of dealing and 
trade usage.316  It makes extensive policy judgments extending the influence of 
the latter two under the Code.  Within these broader judgments, the legislative 
decision to elevate the express terms is not just an incidental point.  It appears 
in section 1-205, which establishes the hierarchy of course of dealing and 
usage of trade across the board.317  Even subsection 1-204(4), cross-referenced 
into section 2-202, has a broader purpose.318  Not only do express terms trump 
both course of dealing and usage of trade, but course of dealing explicitly 
trumps usage of trade.  Judicial departure from the text here is plain defiance of 
a decision about which the legislature is entitled to have its way. 
D.  2-205: Firm Offers 
Section 2-205 makes written firm offers irrevocable within certain limits.  
The common view is that the writing requirement of 2-205 may be excused 
where the promisee relies on an oral promise to keep an offer open.319  In large 
part, this counter-textual interpretation of 2-205 can be attributed to the inertial 
power of “Drennan-style” promissory estoppel cases.320  Those claims arise in 
the competitive bidding context, where a general contractor relies on bids from 
subcontractors to prepare his own bid to a prime contractor.321  A degree of 
reliance risk by the general contractor is inherent in the transaction and is 
awkward to work around.  Courts consistently employ promissory estoppel to 
render subcontractors’ offers irrevocable even though the general contractor 
paid no consideration to bind the offer.322   
In contrast to many types of promissory estoppel claims, Drennan-style 
promissory estoppel is a highly compelling and generally successful claim.323  
                                                                                                                 
state law on parol evidence questions.  See, e.g., AM Int’l, Inc. v. Graphic Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 
44 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 315. U.C.C. § 2-202. 
 316. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 317. U.C.C. § 1-205. 
 318. Id. § 1-205(4); id. § 2-202. 
 319. Id. § 2-205; Ingrid Michelson Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s 
Attempt to Achieve the Good, the True, and the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 
1152 (1984). 
 320. See KNAPP ET AL., supra note 24, at 140 (citing E. A. Coronis Assoc. v. M. Gordon 
Constr. Co., 216 A.2d 246 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1966)). 
 321. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 759 (Cal. 1958). 
 322. See KNAPP ET AL., supra note 24, at 117 (noting that the “overwhelming majority” of 
courts have followed Drennan). 
 323. Id. 
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The gravitational pull of the Drennan-style cases has been so strong that even 
in subcontractor bidding cases primarily involving goods—where 2-205 firm 
offer requirements should control—courts tend to rule that oral offers unbound 
by consideration are made irrevocable by the offeree’s reliance.324  Prominent 
commentators agree. 
These views are counter-textual because they impose the duties of a firm 
offer in cases where the statutory requirements are not satisfied.325  However, 
this is not as pure a case as we observed, for example, under section  
2-306—i.e., a flat “not x” interpretation of “x.”  Here, there is a plausible 
argument that courts are not exactly repudiating the explicit writing 
requirement of 2-205; instead, they are just grafting onto the firm offer, a 
common law appendage drawn from an influential strain of cases.326  The 
argument for this approach is aided by the explicit textual endorsement in 
section 1-103 that traditional principles of law and equity survive the Code 
unless displaced by particular provisions.327  Since section 2-205 does not 
expressly prohibit the use of promissory estoppel to make promises 
irrevocable, the license of section 1-103 plausibly supports the enforcement of 
oral “firm offers.”328   
This argument is diminished by a fuller understanding of the license granted 
by section 1-103.  As William Hawkland emphasized early on, section  
1-103 permits non-displaced provisions of common law and equity to 
supplement the provisions of the Code, but does not allow the common law 
and equity to supplant them.329  This difference, Hawkland argues, is vital.330  
Respect for the Code qua Code demands that courts, where possible, answer 
questions from within the Code.331  Understanding supplementation in this 
context helps to answer whether section 1-103 is an invitation to graft 
promissory estoppel onto 2-205.  The example of section 2-403 provides the 
illustration.   
Operation of section 2-403, governing the power to transfer goods, depends 
on the distinction between void and voidable title.  The Code does not define 
void or voidable.332  Understanding the section requires supplementation with 
                                                 
 324. White and Summers suggest that even when “Section 2-205 is not met, this should not 
be taken to prevent offerees from invoking promissory estoppel.”  WHITE & SUMMERS, supra 
note 28, at 49.  Robert Nordstrom’s sales treatise takes the same view.  ROBERT J. NORDSTROM, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 33, at 86 (1970). 
 325. See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
 326. See KNAPP ET AL., supra note 24, at 140. 
 327. Jenkins, supra note 13, at 496. 
 328. Cf. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 24, at 139–40; U.C.C. § 2-205 (2011). 
 329. Hawkland, supra note 90, at 313; see also supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text. 
 330. See Hawkland, supra note 90, at 313. 
 331. See id. 
 332. See U.C.C. § 2-403 (2011). 
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common law definitions of these terms.333  Commentators like Hawkland 
cannot fairly object to this supplementation because it is invited by the text.  
Contrast section 2-205:334 unlike section 2-403, which includes the common 
law terms “void” and “voidable” in the text, section 2-205 makes no reference 
to promissory estoppel.335  This omission does not make the text linguistically 
ambiguous.  Also, because the concept of promissory estoppel was evident at 
the time the Code was drafted, debated and adopted, the section 2-205 
omission should not be considered mere happenstance.336   
The principle under which promissory estoppel is injected into 2-205 must 
be that it is applicable any place that it is not expressly excluded.  But that 
approach gives promissory estoppel pervasive influence.  The question is 
whether that is consistent with section 1-103.337  In the context of 2-205, does 
promissory estoppel supplement or supplant?  Professor Gibson argues that 
these cases are largely a consequence of the gravitational pull of the Drennan 
analysis.338  The Drennan scenario defies the norm wherein promissory 
estoppel is an argument often made, but rarely successful.339  In the Drennan 
scenario, promissory estoppel is an especially compelling and generally 
successful argument, and the appeal carries over into cases explicitly governed 
by Article 2.340    
On this view, promissory estoppel applies not because of some particular 
need within the Code for supplementation, but rather because it is a common 
law/equity impulse, and its primary force is simply inertia.  So while the Code 
anticipates supplementation by equitable principles, Article 1 demands a 
stronger rationale than we do this here because it is a familiar and comfortable 
extension of what we do outside the Code.  Article 1 is not a license to integrate 
principles of common law and equity into the Code indiscriminately.341  Cases 
                                                 
 333. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 334. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 335. Compare U.C.C. § 2-205, with id. § 2-403. 
 336. See Gibson, supra note 30, at 666. 
 337. Section 1-103 commands that, “unless displaced by particular provisions,” principles of 
common law and estoppel should supplement the Code.  U.C.C. § 2-103. 
 338. Gibson, supra note 30, at 704–06. 
 339. See Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An 
Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 589 (1998) (providing tables 
analyzing the success rate of promissory estoppel claims). 
 340. See Gibson, supra note 30, at 704–06 (noting that this includes Article 2’s domain over 
bids involving goods). 
 341. Another more explicitly Code-based approach to the problem is drawn from Sarah 
Jenkins’ reporting of the implications of revised Article 1.  See Jenkins, supra note 13, at 507–15.  
As an example of the interpretative methodology demanded by revised Article 1, Jenkins cites In 
re Hoover, which applied Article 9 to determine priority of creditors claims to crops growing on 
leased land, but also permitted lessor recovery in restitution for the uncompensated time the crops 
matured on her land.  Id. at 508 (citing 35 B.R. 432 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).  Although this example, 
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that graft promissory estoppel onto section 2-205 are just adopting a policy 
option that the text does not provide.  And that is difficult to square with the 
principle of legislative supremacy.342 
There is still the worry of undercrediting the importance of equity as a 
leveling influence on and within the Code.  Professor Robyn Meadows makes 
a strong claim for liberal supplementation of the Code with equitable 
principles.343  She argues that section 1-103 is a continuation of the policy 
under the Uniform Revised Sales Act, which endorsed the application of 
equitable principles to sales transactions.344  Meadows presses her claim in the 
context of Article 9, with two powerful examples of secured creditors basically 
defrauding other secured creditors in a way that Article 9 would not redress 
without incorporation of equitable principles of estoppel and unjust 
enrichment.345  She acknowledges that injecting these equitable doctrines 
diminishes predictability in order to do justice.346  This captures the general 
conflict between predictability and fairness that this Article has argued requires 
particular attention under Article 2 and especially on the question of 
supplementation through promissory estoppel.  
In Part II, this Article proffered that counter-textual interpretations of Article 
2 are particularly problematic because those rules are more broadly 
applicable—the general rules of the commercial road.  Within Article 2, some 
rules are more basic than others.  These ubiquitous commercial traffic signals 
must be interpreted in a fashion consistent with the textual form in which 
ordinary traders will engage them.   
Within the conflict between predictability and justice posed by the injection 
of promissory estoppel, this argument yields a similar hierarchy.  Whether to 
“supplement” Article 2 with promissory estoppel requires close attention to the 
function of the particular section.  Where promissory estoppel confounds the 
plain and accessible meaning of basic commercial traffic signals, the price of 
justice is very high.  That is the case with section 2-205, where injecting 
promissory estoppel changes entirely the straightforward meaning of the 
                                                                                                                 
along with the broad guidance she describes, seems to preclude direct counter-textual 
interpretations, the example of Hoover raises a fair question about whether “supplementation” of 
provisions like section 2-205 and section 2-201 would be proper even under this constricted 
version of section 1-103. 
 342. See id. at 505–06; see also Gibson, supra note 30, at 697. 
 343. See Meadows, supra note 157, at 537–38. 
 344. Id. at 538 (noting that certain principles, which are not addressed in the Code, are 
important in the commercial arena and should not be eliminated). 
 345. Id. at 545–51. 
 346. Id. at 550–51.  Article 9’s formalist priority scheme generally disregards knowledge and 
culpability.  Id. at 550. 
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text.347  Even if technically we call this supplementation,348 in operation it 
repudiates the rule that only some written offers are irrevocable. 
The policy interests of clarity, accessibility, and predictability argue against 
disappointing the reasonable expectations of ordinary traders and counsel 
fidelity to the text of 2-205.349  
E.  Section 2-201: Promissory Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds 
Section 2-201 describes when a contract for the sale of goods must be in 
writing.350  Unlike the common law rule, reflected in section 139 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, it does not include a promissory estoppel 
exception.351  Some courts exercise restraint, concluding that exceptions to 
section 2-201 are limited to those stated in the text.352  But the decisions are 
split, with some cases employing a promissory estoppel exception even though 
it is not mentioned in the text. 353 
As a threshold matter, section 2-201 is easily characterized as a fundamental 
rule of the commercial road.  It treats a basic question about which traders, 
consumers, and small merchants generally have instincts and questions.  The 
text makes plain the variables that affect whether a contract must be in 
writing.354  In jurisdictions where courts supplement 2-201 with a promissory 
estoppel-type exception, the uncounseled trader who makes the small effort to 
educate himself is rewarded with an unpleasant surprise.   
Promissory estoppel is the ultimate common law puzzle.  It requires that we 
wrestle with the nebulous principles of equity to predict outcomes.  Although 
not technically complex, it is quintessentially lawyer’s law because its 
flexibility defies lay expectations about how the law operates.  Counter-textual 
interpretations that shroud the plain signals of section 2-201 in the fog of a 
pseudo-promissory estoppel exception undercut transparency and 
predictability. 
                                                 
 347. See Gibson, supra note 30, at 703. 
 348. “Supplementation” might fit because section 2-205 does not expressly preclude the use 
of promissory estoppel.  Id. at 675. 
 349. See Meadows, supra note 157, at 542–45. 
 350. U.C.C. § 2-201 (2011). 
 351. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981). 
 352. See Gulbis, supra note 26, at 1019–20. 
 353. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 24, at 343. This is a good example of the central dilemma 
inherent in the Code, where it is plainly a statute, but it also invites liberal interpretation.  In this 
context, the text explicitly verifies in section 1-103 that residual principles of law and equity shall 
supplement the Code, unless displaced by particular provisions.  U.C.C. § 1-103.  Promissory 
estoppel is fairly within those principles of equity.  Id.  Because section 2-201 does not explicitly 
mention promissory estoppel, it is plausible to argue that it does not “displace” it.  KNAPP ET AL., 
supra note 24, at 345.  There is nothing in the Code to dictate whether the result should privilege 
the text or supplement it. 
 354. See U.C.C. § 2-201. 
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The idea of a promissory estoppel exception to 2-201 adds another data 
point to our spectrum of interpretative license and duty.  Primarily this article 
has used the term “counter-textual interpretation” to identify worrisome textual 
departures.   But a promissory estoppel exception to 2-201 is less counter-
textual than extra-textual in that section 2-201 does not explicitly bar a 
promissory estoppel exception.355  Moreover, the Code does indeed endorse 
incorporation of principles of common law and equity to fill gaps or resolve 
ambiguities.356  So layering section 2-201 with a reliance exception seems less 
offensive to the text than the “not x” holding in the face of an explicit statutory 
command “x.”   
Still it is harder to justify than, say, Judge Posner’s creative solution to the 
textual puzzle of 2-209(4).357  Courts that fold Restatement section 139 
principles into section 2-201 are not, strictly speaking, filling gaps or resolving 
textual or circumstantial ambiguities.358  The language of section  
2-201 does not pose the kind of puzzle we find in section 2-209 and the idea of 
a reliance exception to the Statute of Frauds is not new.359   
The cases that graft a promissory estoppel exception onto section 2-201 
simply embellish the policy decision imbedded in the text.360  They weaken the 
UCC Statute of Frauds by broadening the range of excuses for noncompliance.  
While this may reflect the judgment that the Statute of Frauds underperforms 
its assigned tasks,361 that judgment produces a substantively different rule and 
range of outcomes than the text creates and replaces legislative policy choices 
with judicial ones.362   
The policy arguments for privileging plain meaning in the case of clear 
commercial traffic signals like section 2-201 are important tiebreakers.  The 
statutory rule of 2-201 describing what contracts must be written is 
fundamental to planning, negotiation, and resolution of trading disputes.363  Its 
                                                 
 355. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 24, at 343. 
 356. See U.C.C. §§ 1-102, 1-103. 
 357. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 358. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 24, at 343 (stating that this is the majority view). 
 359. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981). 
 360. See Gibson, supra note 30, at 690–96. 
 361. The criticism that the Statute of Frauds causes more mischief than it prevents is 
longstanding.  See Michael Braunstein, Remedy, Reason and the Statute of Frauds: A Critical 
Economic Analysis, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 383, 422–31 (1989) (stating that the Statute of Frauds 
creates an incentive to lie).  See generally Hugh E. Willis, The Statute of Frauds – A Legal 
Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427 (1928) (asserting that the Statute of Frauds causes more fraud than 
it prevents). 
 362. Also, the degree to which we incorporate promissory estoppel is an important policy 
decision, because it threatens so much mischief in its unintended consequences and its essential 
incompatibility with much of classical contract law. See KNAPP ET AL., supra note 24, at 250–53. 
 363. See Gibson, supra note 30, at 690. 
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instructions are plain.  Injecting promissory estoppel makes this plain language 
a trap for the uncounseled. 
F.  Section 2-209: Modification 
Section 2-209 is a puzzle.  There is a mystery imbedded in the text itself.  
What is the character of the failed (oral) modification that nonetheless may 
operate as a waiver (with the identical effect as a modification) under  
2-209(4)?  The leading case on the question is National Metal Crafters v. 
Wisconsin Knife Works.364  It is notable for the division between Judges 
Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook over how to resolve the puzzle.  Judge 
Posner’s offering is a pure common law production.365  Unbound by the text of 
2-209, Judge Posner adopts a put your money where your claim is standard.  
The driving aim, he reasons, is to discern whether the oral modification claim 
is fabricated.366  Therefore, reasons Judge Posner, the only failed modifications 
(i.e., oral modifications in the face of a NOM clause) that qualify as waivers 
are those upon which the claimant relies.367  Reliance, he argues, is a better 
vouchsafe for legitimacy than either consideration (which might be just a 
peppercorn and easy to concoct) or a writing (which might or might not have 
been read and understood and truly consented to).368  It is a powerfully 
reasoned solution and utterly without support in the text—a wholly common 
law mode of judging. 
Judge Easterbrook’s dissent engages the same problem in a more reserved 
fashion that is more easily reconciled with the general administrative 
instructions of Article 1.369  Section 2-209(4), says Judge Easterbrook, is really 
not much of a mystery.  Channeling the instructions of sections 1-102 and 1-
103, he looks to the common law to understand the terms “waiver” and 
“modification.”370  Judge Easterbrook shows that the waiver at common law 
was the surrender of a known right—a subtraction from the document.371  
Modification on the other hand, connotes the addition of new terms and 
obligations.372  Only traditional waivers will qualify under 2-209(4), indeed, 
only the subset extracted in good faith.373 
                                                 
 364. 781 F.2d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 365. This seems consistent with Judge Posner’s articulated view that judges should try to 
imaginatively reconstruct what the enacting legislature would have wanted.  See Posner, supra 
note 264, at 186–90. 
 366. Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1286–87. 
 367. Id. at 1287. 
 368. Id. 
 369. See infra note 376. 
 370. Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1290 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. at 1291. 
 373. Id. at 1291–92. 
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So neither Judge Posner’s renovations nor their collateral damage is needed 
says Judge Easterbrook.  His analysis is quoted at length here because, 
considering the upcoming discussion of Judge Easterbrook’s own repair work 
on section 2-207, it is so ironic.    
“Waiver” therefore ought to mean the same in subsections (4) and 
(5). Unsuccessful attempts at modification may be waivers under 
Sec. 2-209(4). Then Sec. 2-209(5) deals with a subset of these 
“waivers,” the subset that affects the executory portion of the 
contract.  Waivers affecting executory provisions are enforceable or 
not depending on reliance.  We know from the language and 
structure of Sec. 2-209 that there is a difference between waivers that 
affect the executory portions of contracts and waivers that do not.  
Under the majority’s reading, however, there is no difference.  No 
waiver is effective without detrimental reliance.  It is as if the 
majority has eliminated Sec. 2-209(4) from the UCC and rewritten 
Sec. 2-209(5) to begin: “A party who has made [an ineffectual 
attempt at modification] affecting [any] portion of the contract may 
retract . . . .”  
Repair work of this kind sometimes is necessary. A legislature has 
many minds, and as years pass these different people may use the 
same word in different ways; so, too, the shifting coalitions that 
create a complex statute may contribute to it multiple meanings of a 
single word, the more so because amendments may be added to a 
statute after other portions have been bargained out.  Section 2-209 
of the UCC is not a slapdash production or the work of competing 
committees unaware of each other’s words, however.  The UCC is 
one of the most carefully assembled statutes in American history.  It 
was written under the guidance of a few people, all careful drafters, 
debated for a decade by the American Law Institute and committees 
of commercial practitioners, and adopted en bloc by the states.  
Vague and uncertain in places the Code is; no one could see all of 
the problems that would come within its terms, and in some cases 
foreseen problems were finessed rather than solved.  But “waiver” 
did not call for finesses, and Sec. 2-209 was drafted and discussed as 
a single unit.  “Waiver” in Sec. 2-209(4) and “waiver” in Sec.  
2-209(5) are six words apart, which is not so great a gap that the 
mind loses track of meaning . . . .374 
The majority makes reliance an ingredient of waiver not because the 
structure of the UCC demands this reading, but because it believes 
that otherwise the UCC would not deal adequately with the threat of 
opportunistic conduct.  The drafters of the UCC chose to deal with 
                                                 
 374. Id. (emphasis added). 
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opportunism not through a strict reading of waiver, however, but 
through a statutory requirement of commercial good faith.”375   
In the context of this critique of Judge Posner, Judge Easterbrook illustrates 
something important.  While Judge Posner takes more interpretative license 
than Judge Easterbrook, both approaches are legitimate, because the demands 
of legislative supremacy are modest.  Judge Posner’s aggressive, common law 
approach is a plausible response to true textual ambiguity.  Judge 
Easterbrook’s approach might be better, hewing more closely to the 
instructions of Article 1, but Judge Posner’s approach is not such a departure 
that it is facially illegitimate.376   
G.  Section 2-207: Offer and Acceptance 
Section 2-207 is the subject of two important common law style renovations 
of the text.  The first is the general extension of the “knockout rule” from the 
easier case of conflicting confirmations to the harder case of conflicting terms 
in the offer and the acceptance.  The second is the treatment of shrinkwrap 
cases and Internet sales generally. There are substantial differences between 
the two scenarios that help illuminate the spectrum of interpretative license and 
duty under Article 2. 
1.  Extending the Knockout Rule to Conflicts Between Offer and Acceptance 
The knockout rule was initially devised to resolve the problem of oral 
promises followed by confirmations that contained conflicting terms.  To 
combat a perceived first shot problem under 2-207, the case law has extended 
the knockout rule to cases of conflicting terms in the offer and acceptance. 
Professor Knapp acknowledges that this may not be the most reasonable 
construction of 2-207.  Caroline Brown observes that section 2-207 explicitly 
privileges the offer, thus the knockout rule, therefore, should not be extended 
to the case of different terms in the acceptance.377  Despite these criticisms, 
                                                 
 375. Id. at 1292. 
 376. Under William Hawkland’s more demanding claim that we interpret the UCC as a true 
Code, Judge Easterbrook’s methodology has a stronger claim to legitimacy because Judge 
Easterbrook operates more strictly within the text, noting the distinction between “modification” 
and “waiver,” whose common-law definitions section 1-103 fairly permits him to invoke.  See 
Hawkland, supra note 90, at 292–93.  The UCC is a true, preemptive Code, says Hawkland, so 
courts construing it should “use analogy rather than ‘outside’ law to fill Code gaps, rely more on 
the decisions of other Code states, and give their own decisions somewhat less permanent 
precedential value.”  Id. at 313.  As a practical matter, free resort to “outside” law, he says, 
drastically reduces the chances for uniformity.  Id. at 314. 
 377. See Brown, supra note 43, at 941–42. 
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most courts apply the knockout rule to different terms in the offer and 
acceptance.378 
On the spectrum of counter-textual interpretations, this embellishment of  
2-207 is minor and evaluation of it shows that the demands of fidelity and the 
policy claims of this Article are relatively modest.  Generally speaking, section 
2-207 goes beyond the claim that judges simply should defer to the text.  It is 
not a plain language command, as countless law students will attest.379  Even 
though it treats a matter as basic as offer and acceptance, it is difficult to 
characterize as a plain commercial traffic signal.  This illustrates that the policy 
claim for fidelity to plainly stated rules of the commercial road touches down 
randomly because the components of trading under Article 2 are not all 
presented in plain language.380 
The first shot problem is obscure.  Administering it plausibly demands the 
attention of specialists.  The knockout rule in its most defensible application 
(confirmations following an oral agreement) adjusts to a problem created by 
the text but is not plainly evident in the text.   The decision to extend the rule to 
acceptances containing conflicting terms seems fairly within the range of 
linguistic and circumstantial doubt. 
2.  The Shrinkwrap Cases and Judge Easterbrook’s Blowtorch 
Comparing the knockout rule problem with the shrinkwrap cases 
exemplified by ProCD and Hill illustrates how the same provision of the UCC 
can generate fair responses to textual ambiguity and illegitimate  
counter-textual interpretation.  Judge Easterbrook’s work in the shrinkwrap 
cases blatantly repudiates the text of 2-207 and addresses no circumstantial 
ambiguity. 
Even as a practical matter, it generates absurd results.  Judge Easterbrook’s 
insistence that the request to purchase, which we cannot call an offer, takes on 
some nebulous form that is difficult to label is highly problematic.381  If the 
seller is making the offer on terms sent in the box, then the buyer is permitted 
to make a counteroffer.382  If the seller, as we might expect, declines that 
counteroffer, the absurd result is that both parties have fully performed 
(payment and delivery are complete), but Judge Easterbrook must say that 
                                                 
 378. See Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1580 (10th Cir. 1984).  The vast 
majority of jurisdictions follow the Daitom approach.  Reilly Foam Corp. v. Rubbermaid Corp., 
206 F. Supp. 643, 654 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
 379. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 380. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 381. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 382. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981) (discussing contract 
requirements of “a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange”). 
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there is no contract.383  The seller of course could reclaim his goods, but on a 
theory of restitution, not contract.384   
Judge Easterbrook does not even engage this possibility.  His analysis is 
policy driven within a narrow set of assumptions.385  To avoid what he sees as 
inefficient results in electronic trading, he implausibly labels the offeror and 
offeree and then defies the legislative command.386  Section 2-207, he says, 
only applies to the “battle of the forms.387  First-year law students know on the 
first pass that this is false.  Judge Easterbrook just excises “confirmations” 
from the text of 2-207(1).388 
Still, as we have said, ambiguity may be circumstantial as well as textual.  
So one possible justification for Judge Easterbrook’s repudiation of the text is 
that ProCD presents a new type of problem that demands adjustment to our 
understanding of section 2-207.389  It is plain that the Code is expected to 
                                                 
 383. Id. 
 384. See U.C.C. § 2-206 (2011) (anticipating that an offer may be accepted by prompt 
shipment of goods); see also William H. Lawrence, Rolling Contracts Rolling over Contract Law, 
41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1099, 1102–03 (2004). 
 385. “Practical considerations support allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms with 
their products . . . .  If the staff at the other end of the phone for direct-sales operations such as 
Gateway’s had to read the four-page statement of terms before taking the buyer’s credit card 
number, the droning voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers.  Others 
would hang up in a rage . . . .  Customers as a group are better off when vendors skip costly and 
ineffectual steps . . . and use instead a simple approve-or-return device.”  Hill v. Gateway 2000, 
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 386. “The district court concluded in Pro CD that the contract is formed when the consumer 
pays for the software . . . .  Although this is one way a contract could be formed, it is not the only 
way: ‘A vendor as master of the offer may invite acceptance by conduct and may propose 
limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance. A buyer may accept by performing 
the acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance.’”  Id. at 1148–49 (quoting ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 387. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (“Our case has only one form: U.C.C. § 2-207 is irrelevant.”). 
 388. Judge Easterbrook’s approach seems generally consistent with his published view that 
while judges should follow the text, if legislation authorized courts to develop flexible statutory 
terms in light of changing values, the courts should do so through primarily a common law 
methodology.  Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) 
(“[U]nless the statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law, 
the domain of the statute should be restricted to cases anticipated by its framers and expressly 
resolved in the legislative process.”). This assumes that Judge Easterbrook draws broad license 
from the text of Article 1.  However, to the degree he extracts this broader license from the 
Comments rather than the text, there is a question whether he has seriously evaluated the 
legitimacy of the comments as text.  
 389. Judge Easterbrook’s idea of good policy is a plain diminution of the position of the 
typical purchaser.  He reasons that this diminution of isolated interests translates into general 
benefits for the broader class of consumers (in the form of lower computer prices).  See Hill, 105 
F.3d at 1149.  This assumes empirical work that has not yet been done.  As a policy matter, this 
belief runs counter to our general assumptions about the virtues of loss spreading.  David J. 
Molnar, Should Loss-Spreading Be the Paramount Public Policy Rationale for the Imposition of 
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evolve as commerce evolves and equally plain that the Internet has caused 
unprecedented changes in the way we trade.390  On this view, Judge 
Easterbrook’s innovation might be precisely the kind of adjustment the Code 
anticipates.  The problem with this is that Judge Easterbrook’s policy 
arguments apply just as readily (perhaps more so) to telephone transactions as 
to Internet transactions although there is nothing novel about trading by 
telephone.  Indeed, the Internet actually facilitates the communication of 
detailed terms and requirements of assent that Judge Easterbrook says is 
inefficient.  Judge Easterbrook’s approach has been widely criticized by 
academics,391 but none of these criticisms have prevented it from garnering a 
wide following.    
This following might be motivated by two things.  The first, and more 
defensible, possibility is that courts have unreflectively embraced the 
rationalization that these cases are purely about electronic trading, presenting 
novel problems that justify rough play with the text.392  The second, and far 
more worrisome, possibility is that courts have simply adopted Judge 
Easterbrook’s policy choice.393  This second possibility reminds us that judges 
ultimately are self-policing; that respect for legislative supremacy and thus 
legitimacy in statutory interpretation depends less on articulated boundaries of 
power and more on plain self-discipline.  The final admonition comes from 
Judge Easterbrook himself.  Just change the subject from 2-209 to 2-207 and 
the point is evident.394 
                                                                                                                 
Strict Products Liability and Landlord-Tenant Law, 22 J. CORP. L. 93, 102 (1996) (describing 
loss-spreading as a toll for making the business incur the cost and then redistributing that cost 
among all consumers).  Judge Easterbrook’s policy critique is essentially that the claims of a 
relatively small number of dissatisfied buyers will impose unwarranted costs on trading.  This is 
difficult to credit. 
 390. See U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 1 (noting that the UCC is drawn to provide “flexibility”). 
 391. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 384, at 1099 n.51 (noting the heavy criticism Judge 
Easterbrook has received for misappropriating contract formation principles). 
 392. See Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571–72 (1998) (“The Hill 
decision . . . takes note of the realities of conducting business in today’s world.”). 
 393. See I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. 
Mass. 2002) (“First and foremost, the Court agrees with those cases embracing the theory of 
ProCD. . . .  ‘Money now terms later’ is a practical way to form contracts, especially with 
purchases of software.”). 
 394. See supra text accompanying note 375. 
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Repair work of this kind sometimes is necessary. A legislature has 
many minds, and as years pass these different people may use the 
same word in different ways; so, too, the shifting coalitions that 
create a complex statute may contribute to it multiple meanings of a 
single word, the more so because amendments may be added to a 
statute after other portions have been bargained out. . . . [T]he UCC 
is not a slapdash production or the work of competing committees 
unaware of each other’s words, however. The UCC is one of the 
most carefully assembled statutes in American history. 
The majority makes reliance an ingredient of waiver [read ignores 
the application of 2-207 to “confirmations”] not because the 
structure of the UCC demands this reading but because it believes 
that otherwise the UCC would not deal adequately with [the 
problem].395 
IV. CONCLUSION 
From issue to issue, the Code imposes the burden of gauging the proper 
scope of interpretative license and duty. This burden is deceptive because it is 
so easy to settle into the permissive common law mode and forget that the 
obligations of statutory interpretation are preeminent.  The challenge is one of 
temperament.  Where the text and circumstances are plain, lawyers can and 
should argue vigorously for fidelity.  Ultimately, it is judges themselves who 
must apply the reins. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
    395.  Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1291–92 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 
